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Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of
the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the common world will
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.'
L Introduction
On June 2, 1997, ajury convicted Timothy J. McVeigh of eleven felony
counts for the April 19, 1995 destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.2 The same jury sentenced McVeigh
to death two weeks later.3 Shortly after the verdict, veterans' organizations
1. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25,27 (1931).
2. See Tom Kenworthy, McVeigh Appeal Alleges Errors in Bomb Case, WASH. POST,
Jan. 17, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 2462441 (noting conviction).
3. See id' (noting sentence). The Tenth Circuit upheld McVeigh's conviction. United
States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998).
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and relatives of bombing victims voiced concern that McVeigh, a veteran of
the Persian Gulf War, remained eligible for burial in a national cemetery.4
Congress acted quickly to relieve these concerns. Within a week, Senator
Arlen Specter introduced legislation that would prevent anyone convicted of
a federal capital crime from receiving veterans' benefits under Title 38 of
the United States Code.5 According to Senator Specter, his bill was "occa-
sioned by the conviction of Timothy McVeigh."6 The Senate quickly passed
the legislation,7 and a few months later, an amended version, denying burial
in a national cemetery to those convicted of a federal or state capital crime,
passed both houses of Congress.' President Bill Clinton signed the bill into
law on November 20, 1997 as the Veterans' Benefits Denial Act of 1997
(Denial Act).'
4. See Peter G. Chronis, Military Burial Ban OK'd - Senate Unanimous, Swift in
McVeigh Case, DENv. POSTJune 19, 1997, atAl, available in 1997 WL 6076989 (notingboth
McVeigh's military status and angry response by both relatives of victims of bombing and
veterans' organizations over possibility that McVeigh would be buried in national cemetery);
see also 38 U.S.C. § 2402 (1997) (granting eligibility for burial in national cemeteries).
5. See S. 923, 105th Cong. (1997), reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S5924 (daily ed. June
18,1997) (revoking veterans' benefits from persons convicted offederal capital crimes). Senate
Bill 923, as the Senate originally passed it, provided in relevant part: "Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, a person who is convicted of a Federal capital offense is ineligible for
benefits provided to veterans of the Armed Forces of the United States pursuant to title 38,
United States Code." Id
6. 143 CONG. REc. S5922 (daily ed. June 18, 1997) (statement of Sen. Specter).
7. See id at S5924 (recording vote and noting passage of bill).
8. See Peter G. Chronis, Bill Bans Felon Burial in National Cemeteries, DENV. POST,
Nov. 1, 1997, atAl, available in 1997 WL 13882052 (noting passage of House of Representa-
tives's version of Senate Bill 923).
9. See Act ofNov. 21, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-116, 111 Stat. 2381 (codified in part at
38 U.S.C. § 2411 (1997)) [hereinafter Denial Act]. Section 1 of the Denial Act provides in
relevant part:
(a) PROHIBMION AGAINST INTERMENT ORMEMORIALIZATION IN CERTAIN FEDERAL
CEMETERIES.- Chapter24 of title 38, United States Code is amended by adding at
the end the following new section:
Section2411. Prohibition against intermentormemorialization in theNational
Cemetery System or Arlington National Cemetery of persons committing
Federal or State capital crimes
(a)(l) In the case of a person described in subsection (b), the appropriate
Federal official may not -
(A) inter the remains of such person in a cemetery in the National Ceme-
tery System or in Arlington National Cemetery; or
(B) [covers memorial services]...
(2) [details reporting of crimes by Attorney General or state officials]...
(b) A person referred to in subsection (a) is any of the following:
(1) A person who has been convicted of a Federal capital crime for
which the person was sentenced to death or life imprisonment
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The Denial Act affects all applications for burial after its passage. °
Thus, although McVeigh was eligible for burial in a national cemetery when
he committed his crimes, the Denial Act forfeits his rights to burial based
upon the commission of those crimes. The retroactive application of a sanc-
tion creates a potential violation of the federal Ex Post Facto Clause of the
United States Constitution."
The Constitution's federal and state Ex Post Facto Clauses bar legislation
that imposes retroactive criminal punishment. 2 The framers of the Constitu-
tion included the Ex Post Facto Clauses in order to prevent legislatures from
enacting arbitrary or vindictive retrospective legislation and to provide citi-
zens with fair warning of prohibited conduct. 3 One clause bars such legisla-
tion by the federal government,"4 and the other prevents such legislation by the
states. 5 The Supreme Court has interpreted these clauses to apply only to
legislation that imposes criminal punishment.'6 Therefore, the clauses do not
apply to civil sanctions unless the sanctions are so punitive that courts con-
sider them criminal punishment. 7
(2) Aperson who has been convicted ofa State capital crime for which
the person was sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole.
(3) [details administrative proceedings that could be brought if sus-
pect is not tried because of death or flight]...
(d) [definitions] ...
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE. - Section 2411 of title 38, United States Code, as added
by subsection (a), shall apply with respect to applications for interment or memori-
alization made on or after the date of the enactment of this Act ...
Id.
10. See Denial Act, 111 Stat. 2381, 2382 (1997) (noting in section 1(c) that act applies
to applications for burial made after date of enactment of statute).
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (instructing that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed" by Congress); see also U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. I (stating that
"[n]o state shall... pass any Bill of Attainder [or] ex post facto Law").
12. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) (limiting clauses to criminal
legislation).
13. See Jane Harris Aiken, Ex Post Facto in the Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment,
81 Ky. L.J. 323, 327 (1992-93) (stating that purpose of clauses is to protect against unjust
laws).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (instructing that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed" by Congress).
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (stating that "[n]o state shall ... pass any Bill of
Attainder [or] ex post facto Law").
16. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390 (noting thatExPost Facto Clauses reach only laws
that inflict punishment).
17. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 615 (1960) (describing limited reach of Ex
Post Facto Clauses to civil sanctions).
EX POSTFACTO STANDARDS
When determining whether a retrospective civil sanction is so punitive
in either purpose or effect to violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses, the Supreme
Court has identified both subjective and objective factors that courts must
consider."s However, courts give congressional statutes a strong presumption
of constitutionality. 9 This presumption makes itvery difficultto establish the
criminal nature ofa nominally civil sanction.2" In addition, the Supreme Court
has established standards for determining whether a sanction is criminal that
courts and legislators can easily manipulate, increasing the difficulty of estab-
lishing the punitive nature of a civil statute.2 This Note investigates these
standards while applying them to a hypothetical challenge to the Denial Act
by McVeigh.
McVeigh could allege that the Denial Act is an unconstitutional ex post
facto law as applied to him. This challenge would require him to prove that
the statute inflicted criminal punishment.' Members of Congress acknowl-
edged that the statute's purposes included denying McVeigh burial rights?'
However, Congress also presented the remedial purpose of protecting the
sanctity of the National Cemetery System. A court would likely focus on
this remedial purpose. That focus, combined with other factors, would
almost certainly convince a court that the Denial Act's sanction is remedial
rather than punitive.26 This Note focuses on the reasoning that a court would
18. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 163-84 (1963) (examining both
objective factors and legislative history when deciding whether statute in question was puni-
tive).
19. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 620 (noting presumption of constitutionality).
20. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 333 (noting difficulty of proving unconstitutionality of
civil sanctions).
21. See Laura Ricciardi & Michael B.W. Sinclair, Retroactive Civil Legislation, 27 U.
TOL. L. REv. 301, 325-26 (1996) (demonstrating ease with which Congress can rephrase
criminal laws as civil laws); infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (noting ease with which
court can find criminal law to be civil).
22. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 615 (noting successful ex post facto challenge to civil
legislation requires proof of criminal nature).
23. See 143 CoNG. REc. S5810 (daily ed. June 17, 1997) (statement of Sen. Specter)
(noting that legislation would prevent McVeigh from receiving any benefits).
24. See S. 923 and H.R. 2040, To Deny Burial in a Federally Funded Cemetery and
Other Benefits to Veterans Convicted of Certain Capital Crimes: Hearing Before the Comm.
on Veterans'Affairs, House ofRepresentatives, 105th Cong. 17 (1997) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Rep. Evans) (emphasizing Congress's desire to preserve sanctity of national
cemeteries); see also infra notes 405-13 and accompanying text (discussing ease with which
legislators can manufacture legislative intent).
25. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (noting Court's acceptance of most
offered legislative purposes).
26. See infra notes 363-72 and accompanying text (discussing potential outcome if court
were to consider challenge to statute).
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use to reach that conclusion and analyzes whether the reasoning continues to
be the best way to evaluate civil sanctions when searching for violations of the
Ex Post Facto Clauses.
This Note analyzes the ex post facto issues that the potential application
of the Denial Act to McVeigh raises. Part II.A reviews the Supreme Court's
ex post facto jurisprudence.27 Although the clauses apply to all criminal
sanctions, the only civil sanctions to which the Ex Post Facto Clauses apply
are those that courts characterize as criminally punitive. Part II.B discusses
the factors that the Supreme Court uses to determine whether the clauses
should apply to a specific civil sanction.28 Part ll.C examines a misunder-
standing that has developed among the federal appellate courts in applying the
Supreme Court's standards to civil sanctions.29 Part II concludes that the
Supreme Court should clarify and consistently use triggering language for the
clauses in order to resolve the misunderstanding and to promote consistent
application of the Ex Post Facto Clauses.3
Part III opens with a discussion of McVeigh's crime and Congress's
response, the Denial Act.3" Part III.B applies the civil punishment standards
to the Denial Act.32 This Part suggests that, under current standards, the issue
might be a close one but that a court would almost certainly rule that the
Denial Act imposes civil sanctions.33 Thus, under current jurisprudence, the
federal Ex Post Facto Clause does not bar the application of the Denial Act to
McVeigh.34 Finally, in Part IV, this Note analyzes the tests that the Court uses
when determining whether a civil sanction is punitive and details the ease with
which legislatures and courts can manipulate these standards. 5 This Note
27. See infra notes 37-100 and accompanying text (presenting review of ex post facto
cases from 1798 to present).
28. See infranotes 101-84 and accompanyingtext(reviewing Court's methods forfinding
civil sanctions punitive).
29. See infra notes 185-202 and accompanying text (describing confusion among lower
courts on application of different triggers).
30. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (suggesting that solution to confusion
would be use of single triggering word).
31. See infra notes 203-32 and accompanying text (reviewing Oklahoma City bombing
and details of Denial Act).
32. See infra notes 233-372 and accompanying text (applying civil punishment test to
Denial Act).
33. See infra notes 363-72 and accompanying text (concluding that forfeiture of burial
rights is civil).
34. See infra notes 363-72 and accompanying text (concluding that federal Ex Post Facto
Clause would not prevent application of statute to McVeigh).
35. See infra notes 373-425 and accompanying text (exploring manipulation of stan-
dards).
EX POST FACTO STANDARDS
concludes by suggesting a standard forpunishmentthat emphasizes objective,
modem characteristics and eliminates easily manipulated standards. 6
II. The Ex Post Facto Clauses and Civil Sanctions Jurisprudence
A. The Ex Post Facto Clauses
The framers of the Constitution considered the power to create ex post
facto laws to be one of the badges of a tyrannical government.37 In a society
that permits ex post facto, or retrospective, laws, citizens are unable to know
the consequences of their actions and are subject to the possibility that the
legislature will act vindictively.38 The Supreme Court has stated that the
purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clauses was "to assure that legislative Acts give
fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning
until explicitly changed.... The ban also restricts governmental power by
restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation. '39 However, the
Court has limited the protection of the clauses to criminal legislation,4"
placing civil legislation outside of the scope of the clauses.41 This subpart
first explores the protection that the Ex Post Facto Clauses provide.42 It then
traces the Supreme Court's development of the Ex Post Facto Clauses with an
emphasis on how the Court has applied the clauses to nominally "civil"
sanctions.43
1. The Scope of the Clauses
The Ex Post Facto Clauses bar statutes that retrospectively change the
definition of crimes or supplement their punishment." The Supreme Court
36. See infra notes 426-49 and accompanying text (describing new objective standard).
37. SeeAiken, supra note 13, at324-25 (noting that "protection against ex post facto laws
was of the highest importance to the drafters of the Constitution").
38. See id at 324 ("Such laws place the citizens at the mercy of the government, unable
to know the consequences of their acts and constantly subject to the possibility of legislative
vindictiveness.").
39. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,28-29 (1981).
40. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) (limiting clauses to criminal or
penal legislation).
41. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,2086 (1997) (noting thatclauses only apply
to penal statutes). But cf Aiken, supra note 13, at 325-26 (noting that retrospective civil
legislation can also violate policies that framers wanted to avoid).
42. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (explaining protections of clauses).
43. See infra notes 49-100 and accompanying text (outlining Supreme Court's ex post
facto jurisprudence).
44. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,43(1990) (noting that clauses bar laws that
retroactively alter definition of crimes or increase punishment for criminal acts).
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has defined an ex post facto law as a statute that criminalizes an act that was
innocent when committed, that increases the punishment for a crime after its
commission, or that deprives one charged with a crime of a defense.45 Since
the ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has limited the applica-
tion of the Ex Post Facto Clauses to statutes that inflict criminal punishment 6
The Court has periodically broadened the scope of what is criminally punitive
to include civil sanctions that have the same effect as criminal statutes. 7
More recently, however, the Court has been less willing to define a civil
sanction as criminal punishment and generally has declined to apply the Ex
Post Facto Clauses to civil sanctions.4
2. Calder v. Bull and the Limitation of Supreme Court
Ex Post Facto Analysis
In Calder v. Bull,49 the Supreme Court considered for the first time a
challenge to legislation based on the Ex Post Facto Clauses." Using English
45. See id at 42 (defining ex post facto laws).
46. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) (limiting definition of ex post
facto to those statutes that punish criminally); see also Collins, 497 U.S. at 42 (asserting that
definition used "is faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post
Facto Clause"); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925) (accepting Calder as exclusive
definition of Ex Post Facto Clauses). But see Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138
(1810) (disparaging distinction between civil and criminal sanctions made in Calder).
47. See Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381,385 (1878) ("IT]he ex post facto effect of a law
cannot be evaded by giving civil form to that which is essentially criminal."); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,332 (1866) (finding civil disbarment amendment punitive and
covered by ex post facto prohibition).
48. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96 (1952) (finding that act
ordering deportation of all past members of Communist Party was regulatory, not punitive, in
purpose and thus not subject to ex post facto analysis); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924)
(finding that deportation of aliens for previous crimes was not punitive).
49. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
50. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394-95 (1798) (holding that Ex Post Facto
Clauses did not apply to legislation that was not punitive). In Calder, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that required acourt of probate to grant
a new hearing on a will. Id. at 3 86-87. At the new hearing, the probate court denied Calder
rights to the estate the first probate hearing granted. Id. at 386. Calder contended that the
statute ordering a new hearing was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Id. at 387. Each
Justice of the Court wrote an opinion upholding the actions of the Connecticut legislature.
Today's Court considers Justice Chase's opinion to be the holding in Calder. Aiken, supra note
13, at 334. Justice Chase began his opinion by noting the limits that the Constitution places
upon both the federal and state governments. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388-89. The Court
then discussed the origins ofthe ex post facto provisions, including the framers' fear of punitive
arbitrary, vindictive legislation. Id at 389. The Court limited the definition of ex post facto
laws to what it believed to be the framers' intent- those laws that make an act criminal after it
was innocently done and those laws that increase a crime's punishment or change the legal rules
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precedent, state constitutions, and the inferred intent of the framers,"' the
Court adopted a "technical" definition of"ex post facto" and rejectedthe plain
meaning of the phrase, which included all retrospective legislation.52 Thus,
the Court distinguished between retrospective criminal legislation, which
violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses, and retrospective remedial legislation,
which does not.53 The Calder Court declined to apply the clauses to legisla-
tion that it defined as "civil," although it left the development of a standard for
distinguishing between civil and criminal legislation for another day.54 Calder
thus establishes that only criminally punitive laws violate the Ex Post Facto
Clauses and that the Court's characterization of a statute as civil or criminal
will be paramount in an ex post facto challenge.55 Although some commenta-
tors believe that the ex post facto analysis in Calder is dicta,56 the Supreme
Court continues to distinguish between civil and criminal legislation in ex post
facto analysis.5
of evidence to the disadvantage of an accused, after the commission of the crime. Id. at 390.
The Court did not believe that the framers included the clauses to secure private rights of either
property or contracts. Id. Therefore, the Court used a technical definition of ex post facto,
involving only criminal or punitive retrospective changes, to create a distinction between
retrospective legislation, which is permissible, and ex post facto legislation, which is not. Id
at 391-92. Because the action by the Connecticut legislature in question was not punitive, the
Court upheld it against the ex post facto challenge. Id at 394-95; see Aiken, supra note 13, at
333 (noting that Calder was first ex post facto case to confront Court).
51. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 391-92 (discussing sources Justice Chase used to
divine meaning of clauses).
52. See id. at 391 (rejecting plain meaning); Oliver P. Field, Ex Post Facto in the
Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REv. 315, 317 (1921) (noting that Justice Chase chose technical
definition for ex post facto).
53. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at390-92 (making distinction forpurposes ofapplication
of clauses).
54. See id. at 392 (declining to apply Ex Post Facto Clauses to civil legislation).
55. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,2090 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting
that Calder limits application of clauses to punitive statutes, thus requiring determination of
whether sanction in question is punitive).
56. See Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380,687 (1829) (Johnson, J., append-
ing) ("[Tihe case of Calder v. Bull cannot claim the pre-eminence of an adjudged case upon this
point, and if adjudged was certainly not sustained by reason or authorities."); Ricciardi &
Sinclair, supra note 21, at 313-20 (discussing other grounds upon which Court could have
decided Calder, including absence of change of Calder's vested rights, separation of powers,
and opinions of other Justices in pre-majority opinion era). Ricciardi and Sinclair also state
that "Calder v. Bull then, is a very weak reed upon which to found a tradition of constitu-
tional interpretation. Arguably, all its argument about the ex post facto provision is dictum."
Id. at 321.
57. See CaliforniaDep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,504-05 (1995) (show-
ing Calder's continued effect on ex post facto jurisprudence of Court); Collins v. Youngblood,
497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (same); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987) (same).
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The Supreme Court revisited Calder's reasoning twelve years later in
Fletcher v. Peck.8 Using both the Contracts Clause 9 and the state Ex Post
Facto Clause, the Court invalidated a statute that revoked a fraudulent land
grant.' Chief Justice John Marshall's majority opinion did not cite Calder,
nor did the Court mention directly the distinction that Calder draws between
criminal and civil legislation." The Fletcher Court illuminated a potentially
contradictory position that Calder creates by limiting the Ex Post Facto
Clauses to criminal legislation. 2 Under this position, the Constitution pre-
vents the government from taking property for prior acts if it intended to
punish the possessor of the property for those acts. 3 However, Congress
could reach the same result merely by dressing the statute in remedial terms."
The distinction made in Calder required this differentiation based on congres-
sional intent, but the Fletcher Court determined that the distinction subverted
the plain meaning of "ex post facto" and contradicted the policies behind the
clauses.65
To avoid these potential problems, the Fletcher Court expanded the
scope of the Ex Post Facto Clauses to include retrospective civil legislation
that revoked vested rights." This expansion implicitly rejected the Calder
standard. For a variety of reasons, however, subsequent courts have nar-
58. See Fletcherv. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138(1810) (applying stateEx PostFacto
Clause to civil disability). In Fletcher, the Supreme Court evaluated a Georgia statute that
rescinded a land grant the legislature had fraudulently given years before. Id. at 131. The Court
first invalidated the act on the basis ofthe "impairment of contracts" Clause. Id at 136-38. The
Court also characterized the rescinding statute as an ex post facto law. Id at 138-39. The Court
negated the semantic difference between criminal and civil sanctions. Id. at 138. It found that
it would be "violence... done to the natural meanings of [the] words" ex post facto and to the
policies behind the clauses to limit the clauses to punitive retrospective statutes. Id. The state
legislature could not have passed the act if it were criminal in nature, so the Court found that
the legislature could not pass the act as a civil statute. Id at 139. The Court found the statute
to be an ex post facto act and, thus, invalid on those grounds as well. Id.
59. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.").
60. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136-39 (finding act violative of both Contracts
and Ex Post Facto Clauses of Constitution).
61. See id. at 138-39 (deciding ex post facto rationale on natural law).
62. See id. at 138 (noting contradiction within limiting clauses to criminal legislation).
63. Id
64. See id. (arguing that state legislatures should not be allowed to seize property retro-
spectively with civil statute).
65. See id (rejecting Calder interpretation of clauses).
66. See id at 138-39 (applying clause to statute and invalidating it).
67. See Ricciardi & Sinclair, supra note 21, at 323 (stating that afterFletcher, "the scope
ofthe expostfacto prohibition could not conclusively be assumed to be limited to criminal laws
only.... Chief Justice Marshall had offered powerful reasons against" limiting it).
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rowed Fletcher's effect on ex post facto jurisprudence." Later ex post facto
cases mention Fletcher only in passing, if at all.69 The Calder interpretation
of the Ex Post Facto Clauses returned to favor with the Supreme Court.70
3. Cummings v. Missouri: Broadening the Application of the Clauses
In Cummings v. Missouri,7 the Calder distinction between civil and
criminal legislation remained. 72 The Supreme Court broadened the definition
of criminally punitive legislation, however, and increased the potential reach
of the Ex Post Facto Clauses. 3 In Cummings, the Court invalidated a post-
Civil War Missouri constitutional amendment that rendered ineligible for
certain jobs those who would not swear an oath that they had not been in-
volved in armed rebellion against the United States.74 The Court found that
the postwar circumstances of the amendment and its purposes revealed the
68. See id. at 323-24 (noting that some may consider ex post facto argument in Fletcher
dicta, that most courts focused on the Contracts Clause portion of opinion, and that by 1854,
at latest, Supreme Court revived Calder doctrine).
69. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595 (1952) (citing Fletcher as case in
which sanction imposed was criminal with civil disguise).
70. See Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456, 463 (1854) (noting Ex Post
Facto Clauses apply only to statutes that inflict punishment).
71. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
72. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,329 (1866) (finding retrospective
disbarment law, cast as civil, to be punitive and thus covered by Ex Post Facto Clause). In
Cummings, the Court evaluated a post-Civil War Missouri constitutional amendment that
required all persons to take a loyalty oath stating that they did not act in armed rebellion
against the United States before becoming eligible to hold certain employment. Id. at 316-17.
A preacher prosecuted for refusing to take the oath challenged its constitutionality, claiming
that as applied to him, the statute violated the state Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 316-18. The
Court agreed with the Calder Court that the Ex Post Facto Clauses only covers those enact-
ments that punish retrospectively. Id at 325-26. The Court, however, refused to limit the
definition of "punishment" to the deprivation of life, liberty, or property and included in the
definition the deprivation of any political or civil right. Id. at 322. The high tide of emotion
against rebel sympathizers that arose in Missouri after the Civil War evidenced that the purpose
of the constitutional amendment was to punish those who could not or would not take the oath.
Id. The Court noted that there was no rational relationship between the oath and fitness of
the excluded professions. Idr Finally, the Court noted that requiring a test oath presented
the inference of punitive intent. lI at 327. These factors led the Court to conclude that the
oath was enacted to inflict punishment and its retrospective application violated the state Ex
Post Facto Clause. Id. at 332. Later analysis convinced the Court that the oath violated the
state Bill of Attainder Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
at 327.
73. SeeRicciardi & Sinclair, supra note 21, at325 (noting potential expansion Cummings
gave to ex post facto cases).
74. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at320-32 (declaring statute punitive and unconstitu-
tional).
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legislative intent to punish Confederate sympathizers.75 Most importantly, the
lack of a rational relationship between the sanction and its intended goals
permitted the inference of a punitive purpose.76 After Cummings, the Court
struck down a few more nominally civil sanctions on similar grounds.
77
Cummings and its progeny are evidence that the Supreme Court will invalidate
nominally civil sanctions as violations of the Ex Post Facto Clauses.78
4. A Return to Stricter Standards for Ex Post Facto Cases
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find
punitive intent in laws that impose retrospective civil sanctions.79 Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy)° exemplifies the Court's hesitance to transform civil sanctions
into criminal punishment."' In Harisiades, the Court rejected an ex post facto
75. See id. at 328-32 (finding that timing of legislation and lack of rational relationship
showed punitive nature of oath).
76. See id. at 320 (noting that severity of punishment combined with lack of rationale for
prohibiting persons who committed certain acts from certain employment indicated punitive
intent).
77. See Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 384-85 (1878) (striking down retroactive tax
increase as applied as punitive and violative of Ex Post Facto Clause); Pierce v. Carskadon, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 234,239 (1877) (nullifying change in answering lawsuit as disadvantageous and
violative of Ex Post Facto Clause); xparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,380 (1866) (invali-
dating statute requiring loyalty oath of attorney on same basis as oath in Cummings).
78. See Burgess, 97 U.S. at 385 (noting that criminal punishment cannot be cloaked in
civil form).
79. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 325 (stating that "the dilution of the values underlying
the Ex Post Facto Clause can be seen to have essentially cleared the path for such deference to
the government" when determining whether statutes are criminal or civil). For an illustration
of how lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead, see Gregory Y. Porter, Uncivil
Punishment: The Supreme Court's Ongoing Struggle with Constitutional Limits on Punitive
Civil Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 517,546 (1997). "[Mlost lower courts failed to find, in the
context of ex post facto challenges, that nominally civil sanctions were criminal." Id.
80. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
81. SeeHarisiadesv. Shaughnessy, 342U.S. 580,593-96(1952) (finding that deportation
statute was not punitive and, thus, retroactive application did not violate federal Ex Post Facto
Clause). In Harisiades, the Court evaluated a statute that ordered the deportation of alien
members of the Communist Party, regardless of when the aliens were members. Id. at 581.
Several aliens who quit the Communist Party prior to the bill's enactment challenged the law
on a number of grounds, one of which was that the retroactive application of the bill to the
aliens was violative of the federal Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 581-84. The Court sustained
the bill on other grounds. Id at 584-92. In evaluating the ex post facto argument, the Court
first noted that it had been United States policy for 30 years to deport aliens who were members
of violent organizations. Id. at 593. Thus, this case did not present an issue of fair warning,
usually at issue in ex post facto claims. Id. Disregarding the question ofretrospectivity for the
sake of argument, the Court turned to the question of whether the deportation in question was
a civil, rather than a criminal, procedure. Id at 594. The Court found that precedent led to the
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challenge to a statute that ordered the deportation of all past and present alien
members of the Communist Party. 2 When determining whether the statute in
question was civil or criminal and, thus, whether the federal Ex Post Facto
Clause applied, the Court determined that deportation was always a civil
sanction. 3 The Court did not evaluate the circumstances and purposes of the
deportations to determine if they were criminal penalties for which civil form
was a disguise," as the Court had in Cummings. 5 Had the Supreme Court
examined the motives of Congress in enacting the legislation, it may have
found animus toward the Communist Party sufficiently punitive to subject the
statute to the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 6 Harisiades is proto-
typical of modem ex post facto jurisprudence, as the Court gave the chal-
lenger an opportunity to show that the clauses should apply to a nominally
civil sanction, but required a showing of compelling circumstances to label the
sanction criminal.8 7
Most recently, in Kansas v. Hendricks,8 the Supreme Court indicated that
the civil/criminal distinction outlined in Calder remains valid. 9 The Court
inescapable conclusion that deportation is always a civil rather than a criminal procedure. Id.
The court did not examine this particular deportation in depth. Id Because of their civil nature,
deportations, including the one challenged, do not receive protection under the Ex Post Facto
Clauses. Id. at 595.
82. See id at 594-96 (finding that sanction was civil and not violative of federal Ex Post
Facto Clause).
83. See id. at 594 (detailing past cases in which Court found deportation to be civil sanc-
tion).
84. See id at 595 (stating simply that deportation is always civil sanction).
85. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,325 (1866) (noting indications of
punitive intent from amendment's history).
86. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 330-31 n.35 (stating that most statutes challenged under
Ex Post Facto Clauses, including statute in Harisiades, were "product[s] of the inflamed
passions of the legislature" against certain groups, including Communists in 1950s).
87. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595 (1952) (placing large burden of
proof on ex post facto challenge).
88. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
89. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997) (finding civil commitment
statute imposed civil sanction and therefore was constitutional). In Hendricks, the Court con-
sidered a challenge to a Kansas law permitting the civil commitment of sexually violent preda-
tors upon their release from prison. Id. at 2077. An inmate committed under the statute for
crimes committed prior to its passage challenged the statute on a variety of constitutional
grounds. Id. at 2078. First, the Court upheld the statute on substantive due process grounds.
Id. at 2078-81. The Court then found that a combination of factors, detailed in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), including a lack of a scienter requirement in
the statute, a civil label, and no clear punitive legislative intent, rendered the sanction a civil
sanction, rather than a criminal penalty. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082-85. Because the statute
does not impose punishment, the Court found that it does not fall under the provisions of the
state Ex Post Facto Clause. Id at 2086. The Court also found that the statute does not have a
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upheld a statute that allowed the state to commit involuntarily violent sexual
predators to mental institutions." The Court in Hendricks recognized that an
ex post facto challenge to a civil sanction required determining whether the
sanctionwas criminally punitive.9 Although the statute inHendricks required
the confinement of the claimant, the Court found that the statute in question did
not impose criminal punishment92 and therefore did not raise ex post facto
concerns.93 The Court in Hendricks accepted the distinction Calder draws and
the burden on a challenge to a civil sanction that Harisiades exemplifies.9
5. Current Ex Post Facto Jurisprudence: Calder Still Reigns
Although the Court's ex post facto reasoning in Calder may be dicta,95
and Fletcher certainly casts doubts on the validity of Calder's holding,'
courts continue to follow Calder's distinction between civil sanctions and
criminal punishment.97 The Supreme Court occasionally has seemed more
likely to recognize civil sanctions as violative of the Ex Post Facto Clauses,98
retrospective effect because it permits involuntary confinement based upon the future danger
to the public; the act uses past criminal behavior only for evidentiary purposes. Id.
90. See id. (noting statute's civil nature and constitutionality).
91. See id, at 2081 (noting that clause applies only to criminal sanctions).
92. See id. at 2083 (noting that "the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexora-
bly lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment," and that other factors
point toward civil nature of sanction (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746
(1987))).
93. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086 (noting that because act was not punitive, state Ex
Post Facto Clause did not apply).
94. See id. (finding that statute must impose criminal punishment to raise ex post facto
concerns and challenger must show it compellingly). But see Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S.
Ct. 2131, 2154 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding limitation of Ex Post Facto Clauses to
civil penalties to be unsatisfactory).
95. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that ex post facto
ruling in Calder might be dicta).
96. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text (discussing Fletcher and its contradic-
tions with Calder).
97. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,2086 (1997) (using Calder definition
of ex post facto); California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504-05 (1995)
(same); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990) (same); Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489,
492 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A civil sanction.., will implicate expostfacto concerns only if it can
fairly be characterized as punishment."); Latham v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 265, 268 (Vet. App.
1993) (finding that in order for provision to be ex post facto law, it must impose punishment),
aff'd, 11 F.3d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision); State v. Noble, 829 P.2d
1217, 1221 (Ariz. 1992) (examining statute to determine if it was punitive or regulatory for ex
post facto purposes).
98. See Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 385 (1878) (finding retroactive tax statute
violative of Ex Post Facto Clause); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327 (1866)
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but it generally is not receptive to such claims." For the Court to declare a
retrospective civil sanction to be an ex post facto law, the challenger must
show compellingly that the sanction, although labeled civil, is in reality a
criminal punishment."° The next subpart details how the Court has deter-
mined whether a nominally civil sanction was criminal punishment.
B. Civil Disabilities as Punishment Barred by the Ex Post Facto Clauses
Many civil laws apply punishment because Congress intended to punish
those affected and to deter others from following the same course of con-
duct. 101 The Supreme Court has recognized that sometimes legislation that is
nominally civil in fact imposes criminal puuishment 2 However, this is not
easy to prove.0 3 A showing of criminal punishment requires more than a
burden on citizens, however heavy the burden.' The Court has developed a
set of factors that it uses in distinguishing between civil sanctions and crimi-
nal punishment. 5 This subpart details the test that the Court has developed
and will examine the factors it has used to determine whether a nominally
civil sanction is criminal punishment.
(finding that amendment requiring oath for employment in certain professions violative of Ex
Post Facto Clause); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138-39 (1810) (finding law
abrogating contract violative of Ex Post Facto Clause).
99. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,2085 (1997) (deciding that law requiring
civil commitment of predatory sex offenders was not punitive); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 594-95 (1952) (finding that law ordering deportation of alien Communist Party
members was not punitive).
100. See Burgess, 97 U.S. at 385 ("Mhe expost facto effect of a law cannot be evaded by
giving a civil form to that which is essentially criminal."); Ricciardi & Sinclair, supra note 21,
at 326 (noting that "[s]howing a civil law to be criminal in function and thus subject to the ex
post facto prohibition was one strategy" for invalidating laws as ex post facto); cf Lori N.
Sabin, Note, Doe v. Poritz. A Constitutional Yield to an Angry Society, 32 CAL. W. L. REV.
331, 343 (1996) (noting that courts must classify offender notification laws as punishment
before they are subject to ex post facto concerns).
101. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 336 ("The criminal domain is not the only area of
American law that involves the application of punishments. Many laws that take civil form in
fact serve the purpose and have the effect of punishing the offender.").
102. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (finding in rem civil forfeiture
proceedings to be punitive); Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 529,534 (1922) (finding transfer tax to
be punitive when applied to transactions completed before Congress enacted tax).
103. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 333 (noting difficulty in showing criminal punishment).
104. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841,
851 (1984) (noting that because "burdens are placed on citizens by federal authority does not
make those burdens punishment"); see also Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594 (finding that deporta-
tion, despite severe consequences, was civil rather than criminal punishment).
105. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980) (applying objective and
subjective tests to sanctions to determine their punitive nature).
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1. Applying the Test for Criminal Punishment Across
Constitutional Boundaries
Bytheir expressterms, many constitutional provisions provide protection
exclusively in the criminal context."° Other provisions of the Constitution,
including the Ex Post Facto Clauses, are not self-limiting but are also relevant
only in the criminal context.' °7 Although these provisions require criminal
punishment to trigger their protections, courts do not allow civil statutes to
avoid these constitutional protections without determining whether the stat-
utes are criminal punishments in civil form.' When performingthis analysis,
courts similarly have defined the characteristics of punishment."° The
Supreme Court and lower courts have applied tests from one constitutional
provision concerning punishment to different provisions without hesitation."'
106. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ('"No person shall be held to answer for a capital ... crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... ; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury... ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
107. SeeHudsonv. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493 (1997) (notingthatDoubleJeopardy
Clause is limited to successive criminal prosecutions); Boyd v. United States, 116U.S. 616,622
(1886) (limiting Fourth Amendment to cases involving criminal punishment); Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) (limiting Ex Post Facto Clauses to statutes that impose retro-
spective criminal punishment).
108. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493-96 (determining whether civil sanction challenged
under Double Jeopardy Clause was in effect criminal punishment).
109. See Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONsT. COMMENTARY 55, 71-72 (1997) (discussing
procedures necessary for proving violation of Ex Post Facto Clause, Double Jeopardy Clause,
and criminal procedural Due Process Clause and noting that all require showing that civil
sanction constituted criminal punishment); see also Aiken, supra note 13, at 346-49 (discussing
punitive nature required for finding that statute is bill of attainder).
110. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring) (linking Double Jeopardy
Clause and Fifth and Sixth Amendments together for purposes of determining when sanction
is criminal punishment); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,2082-85 (1997) (using ex post
facto, double jeopardy, and Fifth and Sixth Amendment cases interchangeably in determining
whether civil commitment is punishment for purposes of Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1086 n.6 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that test for
doublejeopardy and ex postfacto violations is same), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998); Bae
v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying ex post facto and double jeopardy
cases interchangeably in determining whether denial of social security was punishment).
Through theyears, the courts consistently have looked for legislative intentto punish criminally,
either objectively or subjectively. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,95-96 (1958). For example,
the Supreme Court has said that it
has been called upon to decide whether or not various statutes were penal ever since
1798. Each time a statute has been challenged as being in conflict with the consti-
tutional prohibitions against bills of attainder and expostfacto laws, it has been
necessary to determine whether a penal law was involved, because these provisions
apply only to statutes imposing penalties. In deciding whether or not a law is penal,
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Exploring the Court's standards for criminal punishment, this subpart consid-
ers cases under a wide variety of constitutional provisions because the Court
treats the search for criminal punishment the same, regardless of the constitu-
tional provision involved."'
2. The Standards
a. Cummings and Flemming
The Supreme Court has ruled that a statute cannot avoid an ex post facto
violation by disguising a criminal punishment in civil form.' The Court has
used a number of factors to determine whether a civil sanction is really
criminal punishment. For example, in Cummings, a number of standards were
dispositive in the Court's decision that requiring a loyalty oath for employ-
ment in certain positions was effectively criminal punishment."' First, the
Court believed that the oath did not relate to the supposed purpose of the
amendment-ensuring that unfit persons do not fill certain professions.14 The
unduly severe means indicated to the Court that the purpose of the oath was
to punish."5 The Court also examined whether the drafters of the amendment
intended to direct the sanction at a group of people rather than at a regulatory
goal." 6 That the oath sanctioned only Confederate sympathizers was an
indication to the Court that the drafters of the amendment intended to pun-
ish." 7 Finally, the Court noted the peculiar historical nature of test oaths."'
this court has generally based its determination upon the purpose of the statute. If
the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment - that is, to repri-
mand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc. - it has been considered penal. But a
statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but
to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose.
Id (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
111. But see W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1208-09 (D.N.J. 1996) (warning against
synthesizing test for punishment from Supreme Court precedent), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
112. See Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381,385 (1878) ("ITihe expost facto effect of a law
cannot be evaded by giving a civil form to that which is essentially criminal.").
113. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text (discussing Cummings).
114. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,320 (1866) ("The oath could not,
therefore, have been required as a means of ascertaining whether parties were qualified or not
for their respective callings or the trusts with which they were charged.").
115. See id (stating that no showing of necessary means indicated that purpose was puni-
tive).
116. See id (finding that drafters aimed provisions at persons, rather than at conduct, and
that provision was punitive).
117. See id at 322 (noting that it would be strange if some of excitement of Civil War had
not transferred to constitutional provision requiring oath created in midst of that struggle).
118. See id at 325 (finding that legislatures have traditionally used test oaths as punish-
ment).
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Using these factors as indicators of a punitive sanction, the Cummings Court
invalidated the constitutional amendment.1 9
Since the Supreme Court decided Cummings and its progeny,12 it
seldomly has investigated legislative intent intensely to determine if a civil
sanction is criminal punishment.' Rather, the Court has accepted an articu-
lated regulatory purpose for the civil sanction as a strong presumption for the
legitimacy of the retroactive application of a sanction." For example, in
Flemming v. Nestor," the Supreme Court found the government's statement
of a regulatory purpose for a civil sanction sufficient to overcome other
indications of criminal punishment. 24 The appellant sought to avoid the
forfeiture of Social Security benefits because of actions he committed prior
to the enactment of the forfeiture statute.125 He attempted to use the legisla-
tive history of the act to prove punitive congressional intent and thus to
invalidate retrospective application of the law to him.'26 Beginning its analy-
sis, the Court noted the absence of any prima facie indicia of punitive intent
such as those the Court found in Cummings.27 The Court then required the
119. See id. at 332 (holding constitutional amendment to be ex post facto and therefore
void).
120. See generally Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381 (1878); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333 (1866).
121. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488,495 (1997) (performing perfunc-
tory evaluation of legislative history); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,594-95 (1952)
(accepting that all deportations are civil disabilities without focused analysis on deportations
in question); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 197-200 (1898) (finding statute nonpunitive
because reasonable regulatory purpose existed for law).
122. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 342 (noting that case law indicates that courts will accept
most proffered regulatory purposes).
123. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
124. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-21 (1960) (deciding ex post facto claim
in favor ofgovernment). In Flemming, the Court examined the constitutionality of a statute that
revoked Social Security benefits from those deported on certain grounds. Id. at 604-05. An
alien, deported for Communist Party membership, challenged the statute on due process and ex
post facto grounds after the government revoked his benefits. Id. at 605. His membership in
the Party, the reason for both his deportation and the revocation of his benefits, terminated years
before Congress enacted the statute in question. Id. at 604-06. Dismissing the due process
claims, the Court required the clearest proof that Congress intended the statute in question to
be punitive to invalidate it on ex post facto grounds. Id. at 612-17. The Court rejected claims
that the statute had similar attributes to the statute in Cummings. Id It then determined from
the statute's legislative history that there was no clear proof that it was criminal. Id. at 616-21.
Thus, the legislation was beyond the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clauses. Id at 621.
125. See id. at 605 (noting retrospective effect of act).
126. See id. at 617 (stating appellee sought to prove through legislative history that puni-
tive purpose lay behind statute).
127. See id. at 616-17 (dismissing claims that disability lacks rational relationship with end
and noting lack of "mood of country" element present in Cummings).
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"clearest proof" of punitive intent from the statute's legislative history to
establish the unconstitutionality of the statute's retrospective application."'
It defined "clearest proof" as unmistakable evidence of congressional intent
to create a criminal punishment.'29 Explaining why it required such a high
level of proof, the Court noted the presumption of constitutionality that the
courts afford to federal statutes and emphasized the hazards in using legisla-
tive history. 30 The Court expressed doubt that the inquiry would be of much
use.' The Court also required the appellant to show to a degree of certainty
that punitive intent rather than a regulatory motive prompted Congress to pass
the legislation.' Applying these strict standards to the statute in Flemming,
the Court upheld the retrospective application of the statute, finding insuffi-
cient evidence of punitive intent to overturn it as an ex post facto law.'3 The
strict standards applied in Flemming greatly reduced a litigant's ability to
show an ex post facto violation in a civil sanction.'
b. Moderated Standards: The Mendoza-Martinez Factors
The Court moderated its refusal to examine closely both legislative
history and objective standards in Flemming with its analysis in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez.'35 When evaluating a claim that the revocation ofcitizen-
128. See idL at 617 (imposing high standard to invalidate statute with legislative history).
129. See id. at 619 (defining standard for punitive intent).
130. See id. at 617 (noting that presumption of constitutionality "forbids us lightly to
choose that reading of the statute's setting which will invalidate it over that which will save it").
131. See id ("Judicial inquiries into Congressional motives are at best a hazardous matter,
and when that inquiry seeks to go beyond objective manifestations it becomes a dubious affair
indeed.").
132. See id. at 620 (requiring, along with clearest proof of punitive intent, that punitive
intent clearly outweigh any regulatory intent).
133. See id. at 619-20 (examining legislative history of act in question and finding it
remedial in purpose).
134. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 345 (noting negative effect ofFlemming standards upon
opportunities for successful ex post facto challenges).
135. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (finding statute
revoking citizenship primarily punitive and, thus, subject to Fifth and Sixth Amendments). In
Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a statute that revoked the citizen-
ship of draft evaders who fled the country. Id at 146. Two persons who evaded the draft by
leaving the country challenged the statute on due process grounds because an administrative
body rather than a court revoked their citizenship. Id. at 152. In order to determine if the
Congressionally established procedure was a denial of due process, the Court had to determine
whether the statute imposed punishment Id at 164. The Court evaluated the sanction using
"tests traditionally applied to determine whether an Act of Congress is penal or regulatory in
character." Id. at 168. These tests evaluated the punitive effect of the sanction. Id. at 169. The
Court concluded that the tests indicated that the sanction was punitive. Id. It relied, however,
on an in-depth examination of the statute's legislative history, which strongly indicated that the
statute was punitive in intent, to invalidate the statute. Id. at 184.
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 591 (1999)
ship for draft evasion deserved the protection of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, the Court had to determine whether the sanction was civil or criminal
in nature. 36 The Court first considered the legislative history of the act.'37 It
also looked at other factors, including:
[w]hetherthe sanction involves an affirmative disability orrestraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into
play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence, whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative pur-
poseto which itmayrationallybe connectedis assignable for it, andwhether
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned... ."'
The Court stated that these objective factors, in part, determine whether a
statute is criminal punishment, although the factors may point in opposite
directions.'39 In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court did not reach the objective
factors. 140 Rather, the Court examined the legislative history of the statute in
question and found that Congress clearly intended the sanction to be crimi-
nally punitive.' 41 Unlike the Flemming Court, the Mendoza-Martinez Court
performed a detailed investigation of the act's legislative history.42 At least
one commentator has asserted that this thorough, in-depth analysis modified
the Flemming standards and made it easier for the Court to establish a civil
sanction's criminally punitive nature.
43
However, others have interpreted Mendoza-Martinez less expansively.
The Court specifically stated that it will apply the listed factors only if an
investigation into legislative history has turned up evidence of punitive
intent.'" The Court also required conclusive evidence of congressional intent
to punish or it would apply the factors it listed to the statute on its face. 45 In
addition, Mendoza-Martinez maintains the clearest proof standard as a re-
136. See id. at 164 (noting that question for Court to determine was whether sanction was
criminal punishment).
137. See id, at 169 (noting importance of legislative history in evaluating sanction as
criminal punishment).
138. Id at 168-69 (citations omitted).
139. See id. at 169 (explaining that use of factors may lead to differing conclusions).
140. See id (resting decision on showing of Congress's punitive intent).
141. See id. at 169-70 (concluding that legislative history clearly showed primary purpose
of statute was criminal punishment).
142. See id. at 170-84 (detailing Court's examination of legislative history).
143. See Aiken, supra note '13, at 346 (noting differences between Flemming and
Mendoza-Martinez and ease for challenges under latter standard).
144. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963) (requiring some
evidence of punitive intent to use factors).
145. See id. (noting when Court is to apply factors to statute on its face).
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quirement to transform a civil sanction into a punitive one.'46 Finally, the
sanction in Mendoza-Martinez was so severe that the Court would have found
that the statute imposed criminal punishment under almost any form of
analysis. 47 These limitations on Mendoza-Martinez support the view that
although it may have increased a potential challenger's chances for transform-
ing a civil sanction into criminal punishment, it did so only marginally.'
Thus, Mendoza-Martinez requires courts to examine both the legislative
history and the listed objective factors when determining whether a sanction
is criminal or civil."49 Although Mendoza-Martinez involved a procedural due
process claim, 50 many courts have used the objective factors from that case
to evaluate whether civil sanctions are punitive for any relevant provision of
the Constitution, including the Ex Post Facto Clauses.' 5 ' However, not all the
146. See id (noting standard that evidence of punitive form or effect must meet).
147. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 346 n.147 (noting severity of sanction in Mendoza-
Martinez).
148. See id (stating grounds for less expansive interpretation of Mendoza-Martinez). One
scholar has argued that "it is doubtful whether the Court is prepared to apply [the Mendoza-
Martinez factors] seriously." Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies
toAchieve CriminalLaw Objectives: UnderstandingandTranscendingthe Criminal-CivilLaw
Distinction, 42HAsTNGs L.J. 1325, 1358 (1991). Cheh notes that the Supreme Court has never
used the Mendoza-Martinez factors to conclude that a sanction in question was punitive rather
than remedial. Id
149. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488,493-97 (1997) (notingthat courts, when
evaluating whether punishment is criminal or civil, must investigate both legislative intent and
objective Mendoza-Martinez factors); Ronald K. Chen, Constitutional Challenges to Megan's
Law: A Year's Retrospective, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 57, 59-60 (1996) (noting use of both
objective factors and legislative history in arguing claims that sanctions punish).
150. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1963) (applying punish-
ment test to determine whether disability is punishment for purposes ofprocedural due process).
151. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493-96 (using factors in Mendoza-Martinez as guideposts
when determining whether statute is punitive for Double Jeopardy Clause); Russell v. Gregoire,
124 F.3d 1079, 1084(9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing Mendoza-Martinez factors as proper analysis
for determining when sanction is punitive), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191(1998); W.P.v. Poritz,
931 F. Supp. 1199, 1209 (D.N.J. 1996) (using factors similar to Mendoza-Martinez when
evaluating ex post facto claim), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d
1077 (3d Cir. 1997); Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 752 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (using
Mendoza-Martinez factors to evaluate ex post facto claim); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372,
1378 (D. Alaska 1994) (applying factors to sanction in ex post facto challenge), appeal
dismissed, Doe I v. Burton, 85 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision); State v.
Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1036 (Kan. 1996) (finding that recent Supreme Court precedents show
Court still uses Mendoza-Martinez factors in evaluating ex post facto claims), cert. denied,
Kansas v. Myers, 117 S. Ct 2508 (1997); Chen, supra note 149, at 59 (noting that courts and
claimants have adopted Mendoza-Martinez factors to ex post facto claims concerning sex
offender registration). But see Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1262 (3d Cir.
1996) (declining to follow Mendoza-Martinez); Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 496 (7th Cir.
1995) (declining to follow test set forth in Mendoza-Martinez). Language in United States v.
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factors are relevant in each inquiry.52 The courts weigh some factors more
heavily than others.' A more recent decision by the Supreme Court illus-
trates how courts have weighed the factors when performing this analysis.
c. Weighing the Factors: Hudson v. United States
In United States v. Halper, " the Supreme Court moved away from the
Mendoza-Martinez factors and ruled that the important distinction in deter-
mining whether a constitutional protection attached was whether the sanction
was remedial or punitive, instead of criminal or civil. 5 Eight years later, in
Hudson v. United States,'56 the Court returned to the Mendoza-Martinez
factors when evaluating a claim that the imposition of criminal proceedings
after the government has levied a civil sanction violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause.'57 Evaluating this claim, the Court had to determine whether the first
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), explains the decisions of these two courts not to follow Mendoza-
Martinez. Hudson disavowed the reasoning in Halper. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493-95 (dis-
avowing analysis of Halper and using Mendoza-Martinez factors).
152. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496 (neglecting two factors: rationality and proportion).
153. See id. (weighing lack of affirmative restraint and historical punishment above other
factors); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (1997) (weighing lack of deterrent and
retributive purposes and lack of scienter element above affirmative restraint). In fact, some
commentators have observed that a court could bend the Mendoza-Martinez factors any way
that the court wanted in order to achieve the result desired. See Ricciardi & Sinclair, supra note
21, at 325 (arguing that either court or legislature can rephrase criminal statute civilly and civil
statute criminally); infra notes 402-25 and accompanying text (discussing flaws with current
Supreme Court ex post facto jurisprudence); see also Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d
1235, 1262 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding some Mendoza-Martinez factors inapplicable to ex post
facto litigation); W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1209 (D.N.J. 1996) (noting that factors to
be used in analysis are not identical to Mendoza-Martinez factors), rev'don other grounds sub
nom. E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
154. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
155. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) (noting that distinguishing
between remedial and punitive statutes determined outcome in double jeopardy cases). In
Halper, the Court evaluated a claim that a criminal prosecution for submitting fraudulent
Medicare claims followed by a civil attempt to recover the claims violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Id. at 438. The Court rejected labels of "criminal" or "civil" as determinative when
deciding whether the second sanction was punishment that violated the clause. Id. at 447.
Rather, the Court focused on whether the sanction served remedial or punitive goals. Id. at 448.
The gross disparity between the fine paid and the actual losses the government suffered
indicated to the Court that the sanction was punitive and violative of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Id. at 452.
156. 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
157. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493-96 (1997) (holding that monetary
forfeiture followed by criminal prosecution did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause). In
Hudson, the Supreme Court evaluated a claim that civil penalties, including money forfeiture
and debarment, and criminal indictment for the same actions violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Constitution. Id at 491. Petitioners, civilly fined and debarred for banking
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set of civil sanctions was in effect criminal punishment.' If it was, the
Double Jeopardy Clause would have barred the criminal prosecution.' 9
Disavowing the analysis of Halper, the Hudson Court held that only criminal
punishment received constitutional protection. 60  In order to determine
whether the sanction involved was a civil remedy or a criminal punishment,
the Court used the test that it developed in Mendoza-Martinez.
6'
The Court noted that whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil
is initially a matter of statutory construction.'62 However, the Court indicated
that even when legislative history indicates a remedial purpose, it will use the
Mendoza-Martinez factors to determine if the sanction was so punitive in
either its purpose or effect as to transform a clearly intended civil remedy into
a criminal punishment." The Court established two limits to the Mendoza-
Martinez analysis.' First, the Court will consider the objective factors in
relation to the statute on its face. 65 The circumstances of the individual
petitioner will have no bearing on the court's determination." Second, only
statute violations, were later criminally indicted for the same activities. d at 492. They
challenged the indictment as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which protects against
two punishments for the same offense, claiming that the civil fines and debarment constituted
punishment such that they could not be punished again. Id. The Court noted that it must
inquire into both legislative history and objective factors to determine whether the civil statute
was punitive. Id. at 493. However, it noted that "only the clearest proof" from the Mendoza-
Martinez factors would be sufficient to override a legislative intent that the sanctions were civil.
Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)). After disavowing the analysis
of United States v. Halper, which distinguished between remedial and punitive sanctions, the
Court stated that the proper inquiry is whether the statute is civil or criminal. Id. at 494-95.
When performing its analysis, the legislative history indicated to the Court that Congress
intended the penalties to be civil in nature. Id. at 495. The Court found little evidence when
using the objective factors to determine whether the statute was punitive in effect. Id. at 495-
96. Thus, the Court determined that the penalties were civil in nature and that the Double
Jeopardy Clause did not apply to their enforcement Id at 496; see U.S. CONST. amend. V
("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life and
limb....").
158. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493 (noting that Double Jeopardy Clause "protects only
against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense").
159. See id. (noting what violation of Double Jeopardy Clause entails).
160. See id. at 495 (noting that relevant test is criminal/civil, not punitive/nonpunitive).
161. See id, at 493-94 (noting willingness to examine congressional intent and objective
Mendoza-Martinez factors).
162. See id at 493 (beginning analysis of whether sanction was punitive).
163. See id. (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)) (noting that
courts must use both objective and subjective tests).
164. See id. (discussing application of Mendoza-Martinez factors).
165. See id. (noting limit on factors to facial examination of statute).
166. See id. (stating that Court will not consider individual characteristics of punish-
ment).
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the clearest evidence from the factors will transform a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty. 67
As mentioned above, the Court in Hudson disavowed the reasoning of
Halper.68 The Hudson Court stated that Halper placed too much emphasis
on one of the Mendoza-Martinez factors.'69 Under the Mendoza-Martinez
analysis, no one factor is controlling.'70 When applying those factors to the
facts of Hudson, the Court found that although both "the same conduct"
factor' and the "traditional aims" factor 72 indicated punishment in form and
effect, this failed to override the other factors." The Court did not discuss
two of the Mendoza-Martinez factors. 74
d. The Current Status of Mendoza-Martinez
The Court's analysis in Hudson altered the Mendoza-Martinez factors
slightly. In effect, the Court merged the "historical punishment" and "affirma-
tive restraint" tests by hinting that only imprisonment will satisfy either
factor. 5 A sanction that does not violate one will not violate the other.'
76
Because, after Hudson, two factors point toward a conclusion of civil sanc-
tion, a party seeking to use the Mendoza-Martinez test in a case not involving
imprisonment faces a difficult task.'"
167. See id. ("'[O]nly the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and
transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." (quoting Ward,
448 U.S. at 249)).
168. See id at 493-95 (disavowing reasoning of Halper).
169. See id. at 494 (notingHalper placed too much emphasis on whether sanction was "so
grossly disproportionate to the harm caused as to constitute 'punishment"').
170. See id. at 495-96 (noting proper application of Mendoza-Martinez factors).
171. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (noting factor of
"whether the behavior to which [the sanction] applies is already a crime").
172. See id. (stating that another factor is "whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment -retribution and deterrence").
173. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 496 (1997) (finding lack of punitive
effect from factors).
174. See id. at 495-96 (lacking discussion of"alternative purpose" factor and of whether
remedy seems excessive when related to alternate purpose).
175. See id. (noting for both "affirmative disability" and "traditional punishment" that
imprisonment is necessary to meet factors); Cox v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 138
F.3d 268, 272-74 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding affirmative disability factor only satisfied by impris-
onment).
176. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 495 (defining "affirmative disability or restraint" as impris-
onment). Imprisonment, of course, would always be recognized as historical punishment. But
cf Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (1997) (noting that not all involuntary confine-
ments are equivalent to imprisonment).
177. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496 (finding lack of punitive effect from factors after
finding both imprisonment factors pointed toward civil); Cox, 138 F.3d at 272-74 (finding
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In sum, a party seeking to prove that a civil sanction is in purpose or
effect a criminal penalty must overcome a tough presumption. 178 One may
attempt to use legislative history to show that Congress intended the sanction
to be punitive.1 79 A challenging party will have to overcome the presumption
of constitutionality, however, and present the "clearest proof" of Congress's
intent to punish in order to transcend the Court's uneasiness at examining
legislative history.' If that fails, a party can attempt to establish that the
sanction is in form and in effect criminal punishment by using the Mendoza-
Martinez factors.' The Court will require the "clearest proof" to turn a civil
sanction into a criminal punishment on these grounds as well.' When
performing both of these analyses, the Court will read the statute in the light
most favorable to its constitutionality."8 The Court has made it difficult to
challenge a civil sanction as criminally punitive and void under the Ex Post
Facto Clauses.'" This is especially true when a lower court, because it has
misread Supreme Court precedent, refuses to apply any test for punitive intent
to civil sanctions.
C. Circuit Confusion: A Misunderstanding of Supreme Court Precedent
In its transition from Mendoza-Martinez to Halper to Hudson, the Su-
preme Court has inconsistently identified the type of sanction that is subject to
constitutional prohibitions such as the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Ex Post
Facto Clause. 85 During the time in which Halper was controlling precedent,
the Court focused on "punishment" as the relevant inquiry into whether certain
debarment statute civil under Hudson analysis); Cole v. United States Dep't ofAgric., 133 F.3d
803, 805-07 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (applying Hudson analysis to find monetary fine civil).
178. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 367 ("Retroactive civil laws ... receive very little
scrutiny by the courts.").
179. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 170 (1963) (using legislative
history to attempt to show punitive intent); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)
(same).
180. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 (noting that Court required "clearest proof" to
establish unconstitutionality with legislative history because looking into such history is
hazardous matter and noting presumption of constitutionality Court gives federal statutes).
181. SeefHudsonv. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488,493(1997) (statingthatobjectivefactors
may be used if subjective factors point toward civil sanction).
182. See id. (noting that Mendoza-Martinez factors require clearest proof).
183. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 ("ITihe presumption of constitutionality with which
this enactment, like any other, comes to us forbids us lightly to choose that reading of the
statute's setting which will invalidate it over that which will save it.").
184. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 367 ("By clothing a statute in civil dress it is rendered
essentially immune from ex post facto scrutiny.").
185. Compare Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958) (noting that question involves
whether sanction is "punishment") with Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952)
(noting that question involves whether sanction is "criminal punishment").
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constitutional protections applied to civil sanctions. 86 BeforeHalper and after
Hudson, however, the Court focused on "criminal punishment."'8 7 However,
even when the Supreme Court has focused on one term as a trigger for constitu-
tional protections, it has used the other.' This flip-flop in terms has caused
some confusion in the lower federal courts. Some lower courts have misread
"criminal punishment" precedents to bar completely the application of the Ex
Post Facto Clauses to sanctions labeled civil. The Supreme Court actually
instructs lower courts to examine the statutes beyond Congressional labels by
using the Mendoza-Martinez factors to determine if the civil sanctions were in
effect criminal punishment." 9 An examination of two cases highlights how
this misapplication of precedent can lead to inconsistency and unfairness.
In United States v. Yacoubian,'" the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Ex Post Facto Clauses do not apply to civil
sanctions. 9' When deciding a claim challenging retrospective application of
changes to a deportation law, the court ruled that because deportation under
Harisiades was a civil sanction, the Ex Post Facto Clauses simply do not
apply. ' The court did not search the legislative history for punitive intent,
nor did it determine whether any of the Mendoza-Martinez factors trans-
formed the civil sanction into criminal punishment. 3 The court addressed the
186. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,447-48 (1989) (noting that distinguishing
between remedial and punitive statutes determines outcome in double jeopardy cases).
187. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594. At times, the Court has referred to the trigger by
both phrases in a single opinion. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488,495-96 (1997)
(referring to offending legislation as "punitive" and "criminal").
188. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 94 (describing invalid laws as those that inflict punishment);
see also DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (same). When the Court uses "punish-
ment" as the trigger in these cases and then switches to "criminal punishment" without changing
the tests, it is understandable that lower courts will not apply the correct test.
189. See United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply any
testto civil sanction); Karpav. Commissioner, 909 F.2d 784,786-87 (4th Cir. 1990) (notingthat
Ex Post Facto Clauses only apply to "criminal punishment" and do not apply to civil sanctions).
190. 24 F.3d 1 (9th Cir. 1994).
191. See United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that Ex Post
Facto Clauses only apply to criminal laws). In Yacoubian, the Ninth Circuit considered a chal-
lenge to statutory changes that caused the deportation of a once-undeportable felon. Id. at 2-3.
In this case, the defendant received ajudicial order barring deportation. Id at 6. Congress,
however, changed the provisions of the statute governing judicial orders barring deportation to
allow the deportation of the defendant. Ra. at 6-7. The defendant challenged the statutory
change as an ex post facto law. Id After dismissing separation of powers arguments, the court
turned to the ex post facto claim. Id at 9. The court found that because deportation was civil
and the federal Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to civil sanctions, the clause did not
provide any protection to the defendant. Id. at 10. The court therefore upheld the retroactive
application of the change in deportation law to the defendant Id.
192. See id. (refusing to apply federal Ex Post Facto Clause to changes in deportation law).
193. See id. at 9-10 (showing court's nonapplication of any test to determine true nature
of change in statute).
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criminal punishment requirement in Harisiades, compared it to the punish-
ment requirement in Mendoza-Martinez, and decided that therefore the latter
test did not apply." The fact that deportation is traditionally a civil sanction
was enough for the Ninth Circuit to end its analysis.'95 Although the result in
the case probably would have been the same if the court had applied tradi-
tional civil sanction analysis,"9 applying the correct test established by the
Supreme Court would have been more consistent and equitable.'97
In contrast, in Bae v. Shalala,98 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit applied proper Supreme Court precedent to determine if
the civil sanction in question was punishment.' Examining both the effects
of the statute and its legislative history, the court found that Congress intended
the sanction to be remedial and that it was remedial in effect." ° Although the
result was the same as that in Yacoubian, the claimant in Bae received the
opportunity to have his claim evaluated fully.
If the Supreme Court used consistent language in describing what kinds
of laws are void under the Ex Post Facto Clause and other similar prohibitions
194. See id. (applying only Harisiades test).
195. See id. (upholding change in deportation law against ex post facto challenge as civil
penalty); see also Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556,1562 (9th Cir. 1995) (focusing solely on "civil"
label legislature gave to sanction); David M. Boyers, Note, Emotion over Reason: California's
New Community Notification and Chemical Castration Laws Feel Good, but Fail "Sensible"
Scrutiny, 28 PAC. L.J. 741,756 (1997) (discussing Rise and its focus on legislative intent). But
see Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1997) (using Mendoza-Martinez test
when deciding ex post facto claim), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998). The fact that the
Ninth Circuit itself is unable to determine when protections apply shows even more clearly the
need for consistent language.
196. See infra notes 402-25 and accompanying text (noting difficulty under current
standards in showing civil sanction is criminal punishment).
197. See Porter, supra note 79, at 546 n.153 (discussing Yacoubian and noting that result
would undoubtedly remain same if Ninth Circuit had used current Supreme Court doctrine in
its decision).
198. 44 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 1995).
199. See Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Halper test to
determine if civil disability was punitive in effect). In Bae, the Seventh Circuit considered a
challenge to the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) debarment of petitioner. Id at 490.
The government debarred petitioner under an act that allowed the FDA to debar permanently
from the generic drug industry any person convicted of certain crimes. Id at 490-91. Peti-
tioner's conviction occurred before Congress enacted the debarment statute. Id. at 491. He
challenged the application of the debarment statute to him as an ex post facto law. Id. The
court noted that only civil sanctions that can be characterized as punishment will violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause. Id at 492. The court first applied Halper to the facts of the case and
determined that the debarment statute had no punitive effect. Id. at 492-93. It then examined
the legislative history of the act and determined that it did not show unmistakable evidence of
punitive intent. Id. at 494-95. The court then ruled that the purpose ofthe statute was remedial
and that ex post facto protection did not attach. Id at 496.
200. See id. (summarizing court's findings of remedial intent and effect).
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in the Constitution, this would eliminate the Ninth Circuit's confusion in
applying the Supreme Court tests for civil sanction punishment."' In order
to remove any confusion in lower courts' application of the standards, the
Supreme Court should use "criminal punishment" to trigger Ex Post Facto
Clause protection. That is the trigger that the Court used in Hudson, and the
Court should use it consistently through its analysis of similar challenges.2 2
It should also be made clear to lower courts that the Mendoza-Martinez test
is relevant when deciding if a sanction is criminal punishment. Consistent use
of triggering language would prevent inconsistent application of Supreme
Court precedent by the lower courts and would promote consistency among
the federal appellate courts.
111. A Case Study: The Veterans' Benefits Denial Act of 1997,
Timothy McVeigh, and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution
A. The Crime and the Legislation
In order to apply properly the standards for criminal punishment to the
case of Timothy McVeigh's burial rights, a brief examination of his crimes
and Congress's legislative response is necessary. This subpart first examines
McVeigh's criminal trial and the action Congress took when it discovered that
McVeigh remained eligible for burial in a national cemetery. This subpart
examines three different versions of the Denial Act for later use in determin-
ing whether the sanction is criminally punitive.0 3
At nine o'clock in the morning on April 19, 1995, a bomb destroyed the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168
people and injuring more than 500."' The attention of federal investigators
quickly turned to Timothy McVeigh, a veteran of the Gulf War, and Terry
Nichols, a friend of McVeigh's and a fellow veteran.0 5 Federal prosecutors
charged McVeigh and Nichols with eleven counts each relating to the bomb-
ing, including eight counts of first degree murder of a federal official.2" A
201. See supra notes 185-200 (noting Supreme Court's use of both "punishment" and
"criminal punishment" as triggers for applying Ex Post Facto Clause); see also Porter, supra
note 79, at 547 (stating that difference between circuits' opinions is "partly semantic").
202. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488,493 (1997) (noting that Double Jeopardy
Clause bars successive "criminal punishments").
203. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 170-84 (1963) (using legislative
history to declare civil sanction punitive).
204. See Chronis, supra note 4, at Al (noting casualties from bombing); Kenworthy,
supra note 2, at A8 (same).
205. See Elizabeth Gleick, Something Big Is Going to Happen, TmE, May 8, 1995, at 50,
50 (describing quick capture and arrest of McVeigh and Nichols).
206. See Judgment and Order in the case ofUnited States v. McVeigh, 1997 WL 471692
(D. Colo. Dec. 1997) [hereinafter Judgment] (listing 11 counts of which jury convicted Mc-
Veigh). The I 1 counts were violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(1997) (conspiracy to use weapon
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jury convicted McVeigh on all counts."7 The jury recommended a death
sentence on June 13, 1997.208
At the time the jury convicted McVeigh, Title 38 of the United States
Code provided for the forfeiture of veterans' benefits for the commission of
certain crimes.2" However, these provisions did not cover MeVeigh's convic-
tions.2t0 McVeigh's incarceration until execution rendered him ineligible for
payment of any benefits during his lifetime.' Upon death, however, McVeigh
would have been eligible for burial in a national cemetery with full military
honors.21 2
Some congressmen became aware ofMcVeigh's continuing eligibility for
burial benefits. 213 Noting a "gap in the law," United States Senator Arlen
Specter quickly moved to revoke McVeigh's burial rights.21 4 He introduced
Senate Bill 923, which would have rendered anyone convicted of a federal
capital crime ineligible for veterans' benefits.215 The original Senate Bill 923
included no effective date, but the Senate clearly intended the bill to apply to
McVeigh's potential application for burial in a national cemetery.2 6 The
United States Senate unanimously passed Senator Specter's bill the day after
he introduced it.
217
Days later, United States Representative Robert Stump, Chairman of the
House Committee on Veterans Affairs, introduced House Bill 2040, legisla-
tion also designed to limit burial in a national cemetery.2 House Bill 2040
of mass destruction and use of weapon of mass destruction), 18 U.S.C. § 844(f) (1997) (destruc-
tion by explosive of federal facility), and 8 counts under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1111 (1997)
(first-degree murder of on-duty federal official). Id.
207. See Kenworthy, supra note 2, at A8 (discussing McVeigh's conviction).
208. See id. (noting McVeigh's sentence of death).
209. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 6104, & 6105 (1997) (providing for forfeiture of veterans'
benefits for fraud, treason, and subversive activities).
210. See id § 6105(a)-(b) (forfeiting benefits upon conviction of certain crimes).
211. See id § 1505(a) (forfeiting benefits upon incarceration).
212. See id § 2402 (describing eligibility standards for burial in national cemetery).
213. See 143 CONo. REc. S5810 (daily ed. June 17, 1997) (statement of Sen. Specter)
(noting that research indicated that McVeigh remained eligible for burial in national ceme-
tery).
214. See 143 CONG. REc. S5923 (daily ed. June 18, 1997) (statement of Sen. Specter)
(speaking on behalf of legislation that would block McVeigh's burial in national cemetery).
215. See S. 923, 105th Cong. (1997), reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S5924 (daily ed. June
18, 1997) (forfeiting veterans' benefits of those convicted of federal capital offenses in early
version of Denial Act).
216. See 143 CONG. REc. S5923 (daily ed. June 18, 1997) (statement of Sen. Torricelli)
(stating that bill would forfeit McVeigh's right to burial in national cemetery).
217. See 143 CONG. REc. S5924 (daily ed. June 18, 1997) (noting vote and passage of
Senate Bill 923).
218. See H.RL 2040, 105th Cong. (1997), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 24, at 42-44
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was more narrowly focused than Senate Bill 923 in a number of ways. First,
it limited the sanction imposed to ineligibility for burial in a national ceme-
tery. 9 This distinction has a negligible effect because incarcerated felons
already forfeit most veterans' benefits while in prison." Burial benefits are
the primary benefits that, incarcerated veterans remain eligible to receive. "
Second, House Bill 2040 limited the number of veterans it would render
ineligible for burial benefits - only those convicted of certain crimes of mass
destruction in conjunction with the murder of an on-duty federal employee.'
At that time, McVeigh was the only veteran convicted of those two crimes in
combination.2' House Bill 2040 would have applied to McVeigh, as it
affected applications for burial made on or after the date of its enactment.'
Representative Stump urged the House Committee on Veterans Affairs
to consider carefully the ramifications and the consequences of the two com-
peting bills, and held hearings on the matter.' After hearing testimony from
interested parties, the Committee presented to the House an amended version
of Senate Bill 923. 6 The House passed that version, the Senate agreed to the
(revoking right to burial benefits of those convicted of certain federal crimes). House Bill 2040
provided in relevant part:
(b)(1) The remains of a person described in paragraph (2) of this subsection shall
not be buried or interred in a federally funded cemetery.
(2) A person referred to in paragraph (1) is -
(A) a person who has been convicted of a crime under -
(i) section 1114 of title 18, and
(ii) section 844(f), 2332a, 2332b, 2332c, 2339A, or 2339B of such title, for
which person was sentenced to death or life imprisonment without
parole ....
Id. at 43. The bill also provided provisions for an administrative hearing in which the Secretary
can bar burial if the Secretary determined the applicant for burial committed the above crimes
but was not convicted because of death, flight, or insanity. Id. at 43-44.
219. Compare S. 923, 105th Cong. (1997), reprinted in 143 CoNG. REC. S5924 (daily ed.
June 18, 1997) (forfeiting all veterans' benefits) with H.R. 2040, 105th Cong. (1997), reprinted
in Hearings, supra note 24, at 42-44 (forfeiting only burial rights).
220. See 38 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (1997) (forfeiting incarcerated veterans' benefits).
221. See id. (revoking most disability benefits).
222. See H.R. 2040, 105th Cong. (1997), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 24, at 42-44
(listing crimes of which conviction results in forfeiture).
223. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 78 (statement of Johnny Killain, attorney for the
Congressional Research Service) (mentioning that only one person would suffer disqualification
imposed by House Bill 2040).
224. See H.R. 2040, 105th Cong. (1997), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 24, at 42-44
(setting effective date for legislation).
225. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 54 (statement ofRep. Quinn) (remarking on wisdom
of serious deliberation of issues).
226. See generally Prohibiting Interment or Memorialization in Certain Cemeteries of
Persons Committing Federal Capital Crimes, H.R. REP. No. 105-319 (1997).
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amendments, and the President signed the Denial Act into law. 7
The Denial Act is similar in many respects to House Bill 2040. Unlike
House Bill 2040, however, the Denial Act renders ineligible perpetrators of
all federal capital crimes and of all state capital murders." The statute allows
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs or the Secretary of the Army to conduct
hearings to revoke the eligibility of any person suspected of committing such
a crime but not prosecuted because of death or flight. 9 Finally, the statute
revokes funding to any state veterans' cemetery that inters or buries a veteran
who has forfeited federal burial rights under the law. 0
Like House Bill 2040, the Denial Act explicitly applies to all applications
for burial made after its enactment."1 The Denial Act subjects McVeigh to
the forfeiture provisions in the statute because his family cannot apply for
burial in a national cemetery until after his death. 2 Thus, the Denial Act,
although enacted two and a half years after the Oklahoma City bombing and
not proposed until after McVeigh's conviction, will render McVeigh ineligi-
ble for burial in a national cemetery. This retrospective application of a
sanction raises ex post facto concerns.
B. Applying the Ex Post Facto Clause
Evaluating a violation of the federal Ex Post Facto Clause requires a
two-part analysis. 3 First, the law must be retrospective as applied to the
petitioner in question. 4  Second, the law must be criminal punishment.?5
This subpart addresses both requirements for applying the Denial Act to
McVeigh.
227. See McVeigh Can't Be Buried in National Cemetery, DENV. POST, Nov. 22, 1997, at
A9, available in 1997 WL 13884325 (describing passage and enactment of Denial Act).
228. See 38 U.S.C. § 2411 (1997) (denying burial rights for commission of most capital
crimes).
229. See id. (establishing procedures whereby Secretary can revoke benefits under
particular circumstances).
230. See 38 U.S.C. § 2408 (1998) (revoking funding for state veterans' cemeteries).
231. See Denial Act § 1(c), 111 Stat. 2381, 2382 (1997) (limiting effective date to
applications for burial after enactment).
232. See 38 U.S.C. § 2402 (1997) (prescribing application process for burial in national
cemetery).
233. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987) (noting that ex post facto laws must
be both retrospective and punitive).
234. See id (stating that Ex Post Facto Clauses only protect against retrospective criminal
legislation); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389-90 (1798) (same).
235. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613 (1960) (noting requirement that law be
punishment in order to violate Ex Post Facto Clauses).
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1. Retrospective Legislation
In order to qualify as ex post facto, a statute must be retrospective in
nature. 6 The Ex Post Facto Clauses seek to provide fair notice of acts that
will subject one to sanctions and to prevent vindictive criminal legislation.2"
Retrospective legislation may violate these two goals, but purely prospective
legislation that provides fair warning of its consequences will not."'
A law is retrospective if it changes the legal consequences of acts com-
pleted before its effective date. 39 In Harisiades, the Supreme Court defined
as retrospective those laws applied to acts committed before Congress enacted
the laws without fair warning.240 When applied to McVeigh, the Denial Act
changes the legal consequences of an act - the bombing - committed prior to
its enactment. Thus, if applied to McVeigh, the act would be retrospective.
McVeigh did not receive fair warning that his conduct would forfeit his
burial rights. Although certain crimes forfeit veterans' benefits, McVeigh's
actions did not constitute any of those crimes.2 41 It is unlikely that McVeigh
paused to consider the consequences that his actions would have on his right
to burial. If he had, however, he could have known that his actions would not
forfeit his right to burial in a national cemetery.242
Some congressmen argued that because McVeigh has yet to apply for
burial in a national cemetery, the statute has not yet changed the legal conse-
quences of his acts.243 The forfeiture of McVeigh's burial rights does not
occur until his family applies for them, well after the enactment of the statute.
However, the presence of an affirmative right is not necessary for an ex post
facto violation.2 Also, the time-of-application argument assumes that the
right to burial in a national cemetery arises upon application.24 Veterans,
however, earn their benefits at the moment of honorable discharge from the
236. See Miller, 482 U.S. at 430 (noting ex post facto laws must be retrospective).
237. See Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1546 (1 th Cir. 1984) (listing goals of Ex Post
Facto Clauses).
238. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 329 (noting advantages of prospective legislation).
239. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987) (defining "retrospective").
240. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-95 (1952) (describing why Court
did not consider statute retrospective).
241. See 38 U.S.C. § 6105 (1997) (listing crimes that forfeit veterans' benefits).
242. Id.
243. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 25 (statement of Rep. Buyer) (suggesting that right
to burial in national cemetery arose only upon death and, therefore, application of statute to acts
committed prior to its enactment would not be retrospective, as long as Congress did not apply
act to burial applications submitted prior to enactment).
244. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981) ("The presence or absence of an
affirmative, enforceable right is not relevant, however, to the ex post facto prohibition .... ").
245. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 25 (statement of Rep. Buyer) (stating that change in
rights would occur at death).
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Armed Services.2' Prior to the enactment of the statute, McVeigh earned the
right to burial in a national cemetery.247 As a result of the Denial Act, he lost
that right."' Moreover, even if veterans do not earn their benefits at dis-
charge, courts have ruled that when a statute sanctions an act that predates the
enactment of the statute, that statute is retrospective even though the disquali-
fication may be prospective.249 For example, in Cummings, the Supreme
Court found the application of a loyalty oath to those seeking to become
ministers to be retroactive in relation to those acts committed prior to the
enactment of the oath requirement." ° Although the oath technically did not
affect an individual until the individual sought to become a member of the
clergy, by barring that possibility based upon conduct prior to the enactment
of the statute, Missouri had retrospectively changed the legal consequences
of the actions that potential ministers had taken." Similarly, the Denial Act
has changed the legal consequences of McVeigh's actions, and although the
results of the change may not appear for some time, the application of the
statute to McVeigh is retrospective.
2. Punishment
The other requirement for a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause is that
the law is punitive in either purpose or effect. 2 In the past, the Supreme
Court has declined to lay down a precise formula for deciding whether certain
sanctions constitute punishment. 3 Rather, when determining whether a
retrospective sanction imposes a criminal punishment, the Supreme Court has
246. See id. at 27 (statement of Rick Surratt, representative of Disabled American Veter-
ans) (noting when veterans earn benefits).
247. See 38 U.S.C. § 2402 (1991) (describing eligibility for burial in national cemetery as
including all war-time veterans).
248. See 38 U.S.C. § 2411 (1998) (revoking burial rights of veterans convicted of most
capital crimes).
249. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322 (1866) (noting sanction could
be retrospective if right it was based upon was barred on basis of pre-enactment conduct).
250. See id. (noting retrospectivity of sanction).
251. See id (finding constitutional provision retroactive and violative of Ex Post Facto
Clause); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611-21 (1960) (deciding implicitly that
denial of Social Security benefits, nonvested interest of petitioners, could be retrospective by
moving to punishment analysis).
252. See supra notes 101-84 and accompanying text (discussing "punitive" standard that
challenger must show to advance successful ex post facto claims); see also Lindsey v. Washing-
ton, 301 U.S. 397,401 (1937) (noting that Ex Post Facto Clauses forbid "the application of any
new punitive measure to a crime already consummated").
253. See CalifomiaDep'tofCorrectionsv. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,509 (1995) (notingthat
Court has previously declined to articulate single formula for identifying those legislative
changes that produce sufficient change on substantive crimes or punishments to fall within
constitutional prohibition for ex post facto laws).
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sought to discern congressional intent for enacting the sanction and the effect
that the sanction has on those affected." 4 The question presented is the
simply phrased, but extremely complex, question of whether Congress in-
tended the legislation to punish, or whether the sanction operates to punish an
individual for past activity."s
This section seeks to apply traditional punishment standards to the facts
surrounding the application of the Denial Act to McVeigh in order to deter-
mine whether the courts would consider the application to be an ex post facto
violation ofthe Constitution. The framework for this analysis is similar to the
framework in Hudson. 6 First, this section examines the legislative history
of the Denial Act to determine whether Congress intended to provide a civil
or criminally punitive sanction. 7 Second, this section analyzes the Denial
Act in an attempt to discover if the sanction that the act imposes on McVeigh
is so punitive in form and in effect as to transform it into criminal punishment
despite Congress's intent to the contrary."s When performing this analysis,
this section emphasizes the strong judicial presumption that congressional
action is constitutional and the burdens the Supreme Court has placed on
proving criminally punitive intent or purpose 59
a. Congress's Intent: An Examination of Legislative History
As noted earlier, only the "clearest proof" of legislative intent to punish
is sufficient to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on the basis of
legislative history.2" Both the presumption of constitutionality that courts
give to enactments of Congress and the courts' antipathy for examining
legislative history make mostjudicial inquiries into legislative history cursory
at best.26' An examination of the legislative history of the Denial Act does not
produce the clearest proof of legislative intent necessary to support the
assertion that Congress intended to punish.
254. SeeFlemming,363 U.S. at613-14 (examininglegislativehistoryandobjectiveresults).
255. See id. at 614 (citing DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960)) (explaining
differences between regulatory civil sanctions and punishment).
256. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493 (1997) (examining legislative
history and objective factors when determining whether Court will consider civil sanction
punitive for purposes of Double Jeopardy Clause).
257. See id at 495 (examining legislative history).
258. See id. (citing United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2148 (1996)) (applying
objective factors test to civil sanction to determine if civil or punitive).
259. See supra notes 101-84 and accompanying text (discussing hurdles that challenges
must overcome to show legislation to be punitive).
260. See Flemmingv. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,617 (1960) (establishing standard forproving
punitive intent by use of legislative history).
261. See id (noting judicial inquiries into congressional motives are "at best a hazardous
matter" and "dubious affair indeed").
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(1) Textual Clues
Often, Congress identifies sanctions as either criminal or civil in the text
of legislation.2 Courts have relied upon such statements as clear evidence
of congressional intent.263 The Denial Act includes no such statement of
congressional intent. Thus, a court must examine the structure and the history
of the legislation to determine whether Congress intended the loss of burial
privileges to be civil or criminal in nature.2'
In the Denial Act, Congress gave the Secretary of Veterans Affairs the
power to bar burial of those persons who are not brought to trial for a capital
crime because of flight to avoid prosecution or death.265 Congress gave this
power to an administrative agency, not to thejudicial branch.2 The Supreme
Court has found that granting the authority to revoke a privilege to an admin-
istrative agency is prima facie evidence that Congress intended to create a
civil sanction.267 If Congress had intended otherwise, it would have provided
the procedural protections inherent in an imposition of criminal punishment.
The statute's placement within Title 3 8 of the United States Code, along with
other civil sanctions that revoke veterans' benefits, ratherthan in Title 18 with
other criminal punishments, further suggests that Congress intended for courts
to consider these sanctions civil rather than criminal.269
262. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 495 (1997) (using statement in text of
12 U.S.C. §§ 93(b)(1) and 504(a) that sanction was civil as evidence of congressional intent);
Porter, supra note 79, at 550 (noting that "Congress usually expresses in the language of the
statute whether a sanction is 'civil' or 'criminal').
263. SeeHudson, 118 S. Ct. at 495 (using congressional statement as dispositive of intent).
264. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1993) (using committee reports
to determine congressional intent); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 170 (1963)
(using history of prior bills to determine congressional intent).
265. See 38 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1)(3) (1997) (rendering ineligible for burial any person
Secretary finds to have committed capital crimes).
266. See id. § 2411 (stating Secretary's powerto revoke benefits after administrative hear-
ing).
267. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at495 (finding sanction civil because Congress gave enforce-
ment power to banking agency); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 (1938) ("That
Congress provided a distinctly civil procedure for [the imposition of the sanction] indicates
clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal, sanction."); Cox v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 138 F.3d 268,272-74 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding sanction civil because Congress gave
enforcement power to agency).
268. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. CL 488, 495 (1997) (noting that sanctions
without certain protections can be constitutional only if court considers them to be civil); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (holding that only judicial trial can impose
quintessential criminal punishments).
269. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997) (findingthat placement ofsex
offender statute in civil probate code rather than in criminal code was relevant when determin-
ing whether statute was civil or criminal). But see Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1377
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This inference, however, cannot end the inquiry into congressional
intent.27 To stop here would be relying on a circular argument; the sanction
is civil because it has no criminal textual indications, and it has no criminal
textual indications because it is civil.27" ' Rather, the prior history of the Denial
Act and Congress's remarks upon its passing should trigger further investiga-
tions into congressional intent.272
Prior versions of what eventually became the Denial Act hint at congres-
sional intent. The first major bill on the subject, Senate Bill 923, includes no
textual hints as to whether the Senate intended the sanction to be criminally
punitive or remedial.2" The text of House Bill 2040, however, contains some
clues. The authors of House Bill 2040 limited applicable crimes almost exclu-
sively to the crimes committed by McVeigh.274 The authors omitted other
equally heinous crimes.275 The Supreme Court has identified evidence that
Congress's purpose was to reach the person sanctioned ratherthan the conduct
that triggered the sanction as proof that Congress intended to punish.276 By
limiting forfeiture of burial rights to the crimes McVeigh committed and
omitting other serious capital crimes, the House of Representatives may have
revealed its desire to punish McVeigh."
(D. Alaska 1994) (determining that placement of sanction in criminal code was not dispositive
of criminal intent but legislature could have placed statute there to facilitate indexing), appeal
dismissed, Doe I v. Burton, 85 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
270. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169-70 (1963) (going beyond
civil/criminal inquiry into investigation of legislative history).
271. See Ricciardi & Sinclair, supra note 21, at 325 (noting ease with which Congress
could otherwise make sanction civil). But see Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 495 (ending inquiry after
textual inference of civil sanction); Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (same).
272. SeeMendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169-70 (going beyond textual inquiry into investi-
gation of legislative history); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 618-21 (1960) (investigating
beyond textual inquiries into investigation of congressional statements); Manocchio v. Kus-
serow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1541-42 ( Ith Cir. 1992) (investigating legislative history).
273. See S. 923, 105th Cong. (1997), reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S5924 (daily ed. June
18, 1997) (stating succinctly that those who commit federal capital crimes forfeit veterans'
benefits).
274. Compare H.R. 2040, 105th Cong. (1997) (limiting forfeiture to those who commit
limited number of crimes) with Judgment, supra note 206, at 1 (listing crimes for which jury
convicted McVeigh).
275. See 18 U.S.C. § 1751(1997) (punishing assassination ofPresident); 18 U.S.C. § 1091
(1997) (punishing genocide). Original House Bill 2040 included neither crime.
276. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 616 (noting that purpose "to reach the person, not the
calling" could establish punitive intent (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,
320 (1866))). Butsee infra notes 430-31 and accompanying text (noting problems with distinc-
tion).
277. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,320 (1866) (finding punitive those
sanctions legislatures aimed at individuals).
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(2) Statements of Congressmen
The statements of legislators in support of the various bills that would
have created new bars for burial in a national cemetery provide evidence of
congressional intent in both directions.278 Numerous senators stated that their
purpose in supporting Senate Bill 923 was to prevent McVeigh from being
buried in a national cemetery. 9 For example, Senator Robert Torricelli stated
that the Senate, by passing Senate Bill 923, would revoke McVeigh's right to
burial in the sacred ground of a national cemetery.280 He also stated that it
would be a travesty of justice to bury "an enemy of the United States" in a
national cemetery.2 ' Senator Ben Campbell explained that the nation was
outraged over the possibility that McVeigh remained eligible for burial in a
national cemetery and urged the Senate to act to prevent his burial.282 These
and similar statements constitute evidence that the Senate intended to punish
McVeigh.
283
Many members of the House of Representatives also made statements
indicating their desire to impose this forfeiture upon McVeigh in order to
punish him. At a hearing held less than a month after McVeigh's conviction,
one congressman pointed to the damage that the bombing caused and argued
that it was not appropriate to allow McVeigh to be buried in a national ceme-
tery.2" Another said that he was at the hearing to make sure that McVeigh
278. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 618 (1960) (using legislators' statements in
conducting analysis).
279. See 143 CoNG. REC. S5922-23 (daily ed. June 18, 1997) (statement of Sen. Specter)
(stating that gap in law allows McVeigh to receive veterans' benefits and that it would be
unseemly to bury McVeigh in veterans' cemetery).
280. See id. at S5923 (statement of Sen. Torricelli) ("Today, by the actions of the U.S.
Senate, he can also have forfeited his right to be buried and have the honor of being in the
sacred ground of a national cemetery of the United States.").
281. See Government Press Release, Torricelli Seeks to Stop Hero 's Burial for McVeigh,
1997 WL 4434042, at * I (giving reasons for introducing legislation similar to Senate Bill 923).
The press release also stated that Congress must change the law "to ensure that McVeigh's most
heinous of crimes will exclude him from a hero's burial." Id
282. See 143 CONG. REC. S5923-24 (daily ed. June 18, 1997) (statement of Sen. Campbell)
("Our Nation remains outraged at that terrorist act and the individual [McVeigh] who was
convicted of committing it. We now are further outraged at the thought of that person being
eligible for burial in a military cemetery beside our fallen brothers and sisters."). Senator
Campbell also stated that he cosponsored "S. 923 to be absolutely certain that any individual
convicted of a crime as heinous as the Oklahoma City bombing will never be buried among our
Nation's heroes." Id4 at S5924. Likewise, another senator stated that it would be a "desecra-
tion" to bury McVeigh in a national cemetery. Id. at S5923 (statement of Sen. Nickles).
283. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 616 (noting that purpose "to reach the person, not the
calling" could establish punitive intent (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,
320 (1866))).
284. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 6 (statement of Rep. Knollenberg) (noting that "[tihe
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forfeited the right to burial in a national cemetery.285 A witness at the hearing
joked that congressmen mentioned McVeigh, his crime, and his conviction so
often that McVeigh attended the hearing in spirit.286 Statements by represen-
tatives of veterans' service organizations opposing the extension of the bill to
other crimes also indicate the bill's punitive purpose.2"7 From these state-
ments, it is clear that some members of Congress aimed the legislation at
McVeigh and intended to punish him."8
Other contemporaneous statements, however, indicate that Congress had
a regulatory purpose in mind when enacting the Denial Act. These statements
indicate an intent to preserve the sanctity of the National Cemetery System.2" 9
A few legislators focused on the effect that burial of a mass murderer in a
national cemetery would have on the families of veterans buried nearby.2"
most heinous domestic terrorist act ever committed ripped apart the insides of our country" and
questioning whether McVeigh should be buried in national cemetery).
285. See id. at 47 (statement of Rep. Bachus) ("We are here today to make sure he [Mc-
Veigh] also forfeits the honor of being buried alongside our fallen heroes."). Representative
Bachus also stated thatMcVeigh's actions showed that he was neither a good soldier nor a good
citizen and should forfeit his right to burial. Id. at 48.
286. See id at 25 (statement of Johnny Killain, attorney for Congressional Research
Service) (noting that McVeigh was present in spirit).
287. See id. at 83 (statement of Rick Surratt, spokesman of Disabled American Veterans)
(calling forfeiture of burial rights punishment and arguing that Congress should not punish
veterans convicted of capital crimes any more than others); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603, 632-33 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that statements seeking to limit
precedential force of sanctions indicate punitive intent).
288. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 633 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The aim and purpose are
clear - to take away from a person by legislative fiat property which he has accumulated
because he has acted in a certain way or embraced a certain ideology.").
289. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 17 (statement of Rep. Evans) ("Mhe congressional
intent is to preserve the sanctity of veterans' cemeteries."). Representative Bob Filner rein-
forced Representative Evans's statement when he stated that the aim of the hearings was to
"determine if this bill [H.R. 2040] would preserve the dignity of the hallowed grounds that our
nation has set aside as final resting places for America's veterans." Id. at 60. Representative
Filner stated that Congress's goal was not to punish. Id Both Representative Evans's and
Representative Filner's statements are suspect, however, for reasons discussed later. See supra
notes 405-13 and accompanying text (discussing problems with manufacturing legislative
history); see also 143 CONG. REC. H9839 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1997) (statement of Rep. Bachus)
("The bill [S. 923] is not to punish; the bill is to protect our veterans. It is to respect our
veterans. It is meant to protect them. It is not punitive."); 143 CoNG. REc. S5923 (daily ed.
June 18, 1997) (statement of Sen. Torricelli) (expressing incredulity that graves next to fallen
heroes could be filled by someone who committed capital offenses against United States
government and noting potential difficulty in explaining that eventuality to veterans' families).
290. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 61 (statement of Rep. Chenoweth) ("For those who
gave lives of service to our nation, and for their families and loved ones, it is vital that we
preserve the sanctity of national cemeteries."); id. at 58 (statement of Rep. Doyle) ("I thank the
Chairman for introducing legislation that would maintain veterans cemeteries as a place of
honor, where families and all Americans can go to celebrate the positive contributions our
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Many congressmen stated that although McVeigh brought to light a loophole
in the law, he merely highlighted a troubling problem - the paucity of crimes
the conviction of which rendered one ineligible for veterans' benefits.29
Some believed that they were fixing a problem that went beyond the factual
situation that McVeigh presented to the more general question of eligibility
for veterans' benefits based upon postdischarge conduct.
292
After examining the statements of supporters of the legislation, one can-
not say with any degree of certainty whether Congress intended the revocation
as a civil sanction or as a criminal punishment. Reasonable minds interpreting
the statements and the rest of the legislative history could differ as to whether
the intent of the sanction was regulatory or punitive.293 When two equally
likely alternatives face the Court, one alternative rendering the legislation
unconstitutional and the other rendering the legislation constitutional, the
presumption of constitutionality the Court gives to congressional enactments
compels it to find the legislation constitutional.2 94 Consequently, the state-
veterans have made to the prosperity and future of our nation."); 143 CONG. REc. H9838 (daily
ed. Oct. 31, 1997) (statement ofRep. Skelton) (querying into reactions of family if government
buried veteran next to convicted mass murderer in national cemetery).
291. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 1 (statement of Rep. Stump) ("This hearing is not
simply about Timothy McVeigh. This hearing is about restricting burial rights in national
cemeteries and entitlement to other VA benefits when a veteran commits a serious crime."); id.
at 63 (statement of Rep. Bilirakis) ("The question before us today is whether or not the commis-
sion of other capital offenses by veterans should affect their eligibility for burial .... ).
292. See id at 3 (statement of Rep. Bachus) ("This is bigger than Timothy McVeigh, and
this should not be discussed as a bill which addresses Timothy McVeigh, because it does not.").
Representative Bachus stated that he introduced legislation on the subject as a response to the
actions of Henry Hays who received full military honors after the State of Alabama executed
him in June of 1997 for the murder of a young boy. Id Representative Bachus introduced his
legislation shortly after a jury sentenced McVeigh to death. See Peter G. Chronis, Military
Burial Ban Faces House Hearings, DENv. POST, June 24, 1997, at A2, available in 1997 WL
6077633 (noting introduction of Rep. Bachus's amendment).
293. Compare 143 CONG. REC. S5922-23 (daily ed. June 18, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (aiming bill squarely at McVeigh) with 143 CoNG. REC. H9839 (daily ed. Oct. 31,
1997) (statement of Rep. Bachus) (aiming bill at preserving sanctity of national cemeteries).
294. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (holding that if valid regula-
tory purpose for statute exists, evidence of punitive intent will not invalidate); Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) ("[IWt is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that
the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered
void." (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810))). For example, a federal
court of appeals ruled that although there was some evidence of punitive intent, the court did
not need to invalidate the statute. See Jensen v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1985).
"Where, as here, the rational connection to nonpunitive ends remains a rationale for enacting
this provision, a court should not reject all those alternatives.., save that one which might
require invalidation of the statute." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted); see Russell
v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1086 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Indeed, even ifthe legislature's nonpunitive
purpose was merely ancillary to another overriding or primary purpose of the statute, a court
may conclude that the statute is not punitive."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998); Bae v.
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ments of a few legislators expressing a punitive intent will be insufficient for
the clearest proof required to show punitive intent.295
b. Objective Standards
After examining Congress's intent and finding that the sanction in
question is civil, a court would next examine the sanction to see if it is so
punitive in form or effect to render it criminal despite Congress's intent.296
That inquiry generally involves using the seven factors listed in Mendoza-
Martinez.297 It can also involve other factors, such as the mood and feelings
of the country at the time of the statute's enactment.298 Although other cases
may provide comparisons, the Supreme Court has stated that it will decide
each Ex Post Facto Clause case on its own highly particularized context.2'
The results of applying these factors must provide the clearest proof of
punitive form and effect in order to override congressional intent and trans-
form the sanction.3" Courts will examine the statute and its sanction on their
faces."' Within these strict requirements, this subsection applies the guide-
Shalala, 44 F.3d 489,494(7th Cir. 1995) (finding that isolated statements of some congressmen
do not constitute unmistakable evidence of legislative intent needed to indicate punitive intent);
Wiley v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1120, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Injudging the constitutionality of the
statute, however, we cannot lightly attribute to the Congress as a whole the impermissible
motives of a few of its members.").
295. See Graham v. Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 298, 302 (S.D. Tex. 1986) ("The comments of
a few members of congress do not taint the resulting statute.... The country is left to judge
what they enacted, not what they said about it."); cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 170-86 (1963) (using statements of dozens of legislators over 100 years to establish
punitive intent of sanction).
296. See United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[The] legislature
may not insulate itself from an ex post facto challenge simply by asserting that a statute's
purpose is to regulate rather than punish prior conduct. The overall design and effect of the
statute must bear out the non-punitive intent"); Chen, supra note 149, at 61 ("Total reliance on
the purported subjective purpose of a legislature in defining constitutional protections would
render those protections nugatory in most practical cases."); see also Hudson v. United States,
118 S. Ct. 488,495-96 (1997) (examining effect and form ofsanction after examining congres-
sional intent); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,248-49 (1980) (examining effect and form
of sanction despite finding congressional intent to be civil).
297. See Hudson, 118 S. CL at 493 ("In making this latter determination, the factors listed
in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez... provide useful guideposts... ." (citation omitted)).
298. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (stating that list offactors is neitherexhaustive nor disposi-
tive); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595 (1952) (citing Cummings when determin-
ing whether sanction was penalty disguised as civil sanction).
299. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960) ("It is thus apparent that, though
the governing criterion may be readily stated, each case has turned on its own highly particular-
ized context.").
300. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493 (requiring clearest proof of punitive form and effect).
301. See id. (directing courts to examine statute on its face); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S.
24, 33 (1981) (noting that ex post facto inquiry "looks to the challenged provision, and not
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posts from Mendoza-Martinez as well as other factors that the Supreme Court
has used to determine whether a sanction is criminally punitive in either form
or effect to the sanction that the Denial Act imposes.
(1) The Mendoza-Martinez Factors
The first Mendoza-Martinez factor courts examine is whether the sanc-
tion involves an affirmative disability or restraint. 2 The Denial Act bars
McVeigh from burial in a national cemetery. A court could consider this an
affirmative restraint, as he is restrained from doing something that he could
have done prior to the statute's enactment. The Supreme Court, however, has
limited the sanctions that meet this requirement to imprisonment.3 3 The
disability or restraint that McVeigh faces is "certainly nothing approaching the
'infamous punishment' of imprisonment."
3
Second, courts examine whether history has traditionally considered the
sanction imposed to be punishment."' History has not regarded the sanction
imposed upon McVeigh, the revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted, as
criminal punishment."° However, Congress traditionally has reserved the
denial of burial rights to thosewho have committedthe most serious crimes.30 7
The Supreme Court has found similar reservations to be indicative of punitive
to... its effect on the particular individual"). This requirement has more effect in cases in
which the sanction given is variable, such as a forfeiture sanction in which the amount forfeited
in each case could vary depending on the circumstances. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 492 (noting
that amount of money varied based on violation of statute). That is not the case with the Denial
Act because each person suffers the same sanction, regardless of the circumstances.
302. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (noting whether
sanction provides affirmative restraint is indicia of punishment).
303. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 496 (1997) ("[jThe sanctions imposed
do not involve an 'affirmative disability or restraint,' as that term is normally understood."); see
also Cole v. United States Dep't of Agric., 133 F.3d 803, 805-07 (11th Cir. 1998) (limiting
affirmative restraints to imprisonment). The Court does not consider all imprisonments, even
if they are affirmative restraints, to be punishment. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
749 (1987) (finding that courts do not consider detention prior to trial punishment).
304. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496 (quoting Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617) (comparing, in
disparaging manner, monetary forfeiture with imprisonment).
305. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168 (noting Court uses traditional punishment
factor to determine if sanction is criminal punishment).
306. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (noting that sanction is mere
denial of noncontractual governmental benefit and, thus, nonpunitive); Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 399 & n.2 (1938) (finding that sanctions such as revocation of gratuitous benefits
are characteristically free of punitive element); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 594 (1952) (noting Court traditionally has not considered deportation to be punishment);
United States v. Landers, 92 U.S. 77, 79-80 (1875) (finding statute imposing forfeiture of pay
for desertion was not traditional punishment).
307. See 38 U.S.C. § 6105 (1997) (listing crimes commission ofwhich results in forfeiture
of veterans benefits, including burial rights).
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effect."' Like the denial of Social Security benefits in Flemming, however,
it is unlikely that a court would find the denial of burial rights to be historical
punishment."°
Third, a statute that requires scienter to impose the sanction in question
creates an inference that it is punitive in form and effect. '° The Denial Act
itself does not include an element of scienter or intent."' However, all state
or federal capital crimes include scienter' 12 Thus, conviction of the underly-
ing offense that triggers the sanction requires intent. Therefore, a finding of
scienter is necessary to impose the sanction.313 The fact that Congress focuses
the sanction on certain acts intentionally done is an indication of the punitive
form of the sanction. 4
Fourth, if the law already punishes conduct subject to the sanctions
in question as a crime, this provides further evidence of criminal punish-
308. SeeUnited Statesv. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,316 (1946) (finding that sanction was puni-
tive because "Congress has only invoked [the sanction] for special types of odious and danger-
ous crimes").
309. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 (finding revocation of Social Security benefits not
traditionally punishment). But see Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1866)
("The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the
circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this fact.").
310. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (noting that "whether
[the sanction] comes into play only on a finding of scienter" is indication of punitive intent);
Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting that lack of scienter element
in statute in question was strong indicator of regulatory nature), rev'd sub nom. United States
v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
311. See 38 U.S.C. § 2411 (imposing forfeiture on all veterans convicted of capital crime,
regardless of intent).
312. See James R. Acker & C.S. Lanier, The Dimensions of Capital Murder, 29 CRIM. L.
BULL. 379,391 (1993) (noting that no state or federal capital crimes lack element of scienter).
In 18 states, one can be convicted of capital felony murder, in which one does not have to intend
to kill, but must intend to commit the underlying felony. Id.
313. See Ward, 598 F.2d at 1193 (noting that although Court found no scienter element
in language of statute, in order for one to qualify for sanction, prosecution must show scienter-
like elements).
314. See ChildLaborTax Case, 259U.S. 20,37-38 (1922) (noting congressional sanctions
for intentional acts indicate punitive sanction). Of course, the special nature of the remedial
purpose of the Denial Act may lessen the effect of this factor. If one accepts the remedial
purpose, then it appears that Congress is trying to keep those who committed intentional crimes
out of veterans' cemeteries in order to protect the cemeteries' sanctity. To then make the
remedial purpose itselfpunitive merely because those sanctioned have committed an intentional
act is circular. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33 (1981) (noting that sanction of denial
of social security benefits to incarcerated felons, most of whom probably committed intentional
crimes, did not make sanction punishment for purposes of Ex Post Facto Clause); see also Rowe
v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1378-79 (D. Alaska 1994) (finding that when sanction imposed
only upon knowing wrongdoing by person effected, this is indication of punitive intent; but
court also elected not to give factor much weight in analysis), appeal dismissed, Doe I v.
Burton, 85 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
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ment.315 The fact that Congress or state legislatures have decided to punish
conduct once is evidence that a second sanction is also criminal punish-
ment .316 In this case, the conduct for which the Denial Act imposes the denial
of burial rights is almost exclusively conduct formally adjudged to be crimi-
nal.317 Congress imposed the sanction only on those guilty of criminal con-
duct.3 1 In some cases, Congress constitutionally can impose both criminal
punishment and civil sanctions on the same act.319 Therefore, the Supreme
Court has deemed that the presence of this factor alone is insufficient to
transform otherwise civil sanctions into criminal punishment.32°
A sanction is criminal punishment when its operation promotes the
traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence.32' This sanction
315. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168 (noting that "whether the behaviorto which
it applies is already a crime" is factor for analysis).
316. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767,781 (1994) (finding that
if sanction is conditioned upon commission of crime, this is significant of its penal and prohib-
itory intent); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) ("The condition of the
imposition is the commission of a crime. This... is again significant of penal and prohibitory
intent.... ."); United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (finding that sanction for
infraction of law is criminal punishment); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557,562 (1922) (finding
fact that evidence of crime is necessary for sanction to be evidence of intent to punish); cf
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,2091 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding it important
that conviction for criminal offense triggered sanction).
317. See 38 U.S.C. § 2411 (1997) (barring burial ofthose convicted ofcapital crimes). The
Denial Act makes a small exception for those the Secretary finds to have committed a capital
crime who are not convicted by virtue of death or flight. See id. (providing for administrative
hearing to determine whether Secretary should impose sanction on certain veterans); see also
Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 752 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (applying Mendoza-Martinez
factors and finding that when statute "is expressly limited in its application to persons who have
been convicted ofa crime or who have been charged with a crime but found incompetentto stand
trial or found not guilty by reason of insanity," this is indication of punitive form and effect).
318. See 38 U.S.C. § 2411 (imposing forfeiture only upon those who have committed
federal and most state capital crimes).
319. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250 (1980) (citing One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391, 399 (1938)) (noting that in some cases other factors, such as legislative history or
form of statute, indicate that sanction is civil, even though "same conduct" factor points to
criminal punishment); Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379 (giving little weight to this factor).
320. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488,496 (1997) ("This fact is insufficientto
render the money penalties and disbarment sanctions criminally punitive .... "); United States
v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2148 (1996) (finding that this factor alone is not sufficient to make
civil sanction punitive). Presumably, however, because the Court continues to include this
factor in the analysis, its indication towards a finding of criminal punishment should be given
some weight when combined with other factors. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 500 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (noting that each factor could tip balance in extreme cases).
321. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (discussing "whether
its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence");
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (noting that classical purposes of punishment are to
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is certainly retributive toward McVeigh.3" Past criminal conduct prevents him
from exercising a right previously earned through military service.3z2 How-
ever, because a court must examine the sanction on its face, not as applied to
McVeigh, the court must ignore the sanction's retributive effect on Mc-
Veigh.324 On its face, the sanction would have a slight retributive effect by
taking away abenefit for prior criminal conduct, the definition ofretribution.3z
The sanction is also a deterrent, though probably only a slight one. The
loss of burial rights may slightly deter veterans who are considering commit-
ting a capital crime.326 Even though the deterrent factor indicates that the
sanction is criminally punitive, the Supreme Court has discounted the weight
that the Court will give this factor in the analysis.327 The Court has held that
deterrence can serve both criminal and civil goals.328 In McVeigh's case,
although the sanction may deter future wrongdoing, the civil deterrent would
also serve to preserve the sanctity of the national cemeteries.329 Regardless,
the possible deterrent effect of the statute is so small that it is negligible for
the purposes of this analysis.
331
Finally, if the court cannot assign rationally an alternative purpose to the
statute, or if the sanction appears excessive in relation to the alternative
reprimand wrongdoer and to deter others); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295
(1935) (finding that deterrent and retributive effects of sanction make it penalty); Manocchio
v. Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1542 (1 th Cir. 1992) (noting desire to deter is punitive goal).
322. See supra notes 260-95 and accompanyingtext (discussing whether Congress intended
sanction to punish). Inquiring into whether a sanction is retributive is the same question as
asking whether Congress intended the sanction to punish.
323. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,2082 (1997) (stating that sanctions would
be retributive if they affixed culpability for prior criminal conduct).
324. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 (noting that courts must apply factors to
statute facially).
325. But see Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (defining retributive sanction as that which
affixes culpability for prior criminal conduct, turns on finding of scienter, and is triggered by
criminal conviction).
326. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 496 (1997) (stating that sanction is
deterrent if it will "deter others from emulating petitioners' conduct").
327. See id. (discounting weight that Court will give factor).
328. See id. (stating that "deterrence 'may serve civil as well as criminal goals"' (citing
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135,2149 (1996))); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442,452
(1996) (noting that "forfeiture also serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive
purpose"); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1091 (9th Cir. 1997) ("That a sanction has a
deterrent purpose does not make it punitive."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998).
329. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496 (linking criminal deterrent effect with civil deterrent
effect).
330. See Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (D. Alaska 1994) (noting that similar
sanctionhas deterrenteffect, butitis deminimis), appeal dismissed, DoeI v. Burton, 85 F.3d 635
(9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision). It is improbable that the effect the Denial Act may
have on a criminal's burial status will sway acriminal priorto the commission of a capital crime.
634
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remedial purpose assigned, then the court will consider the statute criminal
punishment.3 If the sanction given is so out of proportion to a remedial
purpose, a court will assume that the disproportionality is based on punitive
intent.332 A remedial purpose exists for the Denial Act - the protection of the
sanctity of the National Cemetery System. It is not irrational to assign this
purpose to the statute. In fact, some members of Congress declared this to be
the purpose of the statute.333 This alternative purpose is not punitive. Rather,
it is an exercise of the power to make rules for burial within national cemeter-
ies.334 One cannot say that the sanction is out of proportion to the govern-
ment's purpose. Indeed, the sanction is necessary to achieve that purpose.33 5
Specifically, if one defines "preserving the sanctity of national cemeteries" as
preventing the burial of anyone who has committed a capital crime, then
clearly the former requires the latter. Thus, this factor indicates that a court
should consider the sanction in question to be remedial.
If a court were to apply the Mendoza-Martinez factors to the face of the
statute, only three of the seven factors would indicate to the court that the
sanction has the form of a civil remedy.336 This is not the clearest proof
required to transform a sanction Congress intended to be civil into a criminal
331. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (listing last two
factors for analysis).
332. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (finding that no other legitimate purpose
exists for statute than to punish); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 318 (1866)
(finding sanction of permanent occupational disbarment so disproportionate to alternative
purpose that sanction must be punitive); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,634-35 (1996)
(finding that action preventing special protection for homosexuals was so disproportionate that
it must be animus-motivated). But see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (noting
that rational relationship exists between sanction and purposes of legislation); Jensen v.
Heckler, 766 F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding rational connection between sanction and
permissible end); Graham v. Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 298, 303 (S.D. Tex. 1986) ("On the other
hand, when the civil statute is supported by plausible (but less than compelling) purposes that
are other than punitive, it will be upheld.").
333. See supra notes 289-92 and accompanying text (presenting legislative history for
alternative purpose).
334. See 143 CoNG. REc. H9838 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1997) (statement of Rep. Quinn)
(noting that Denial Act was "an exercise of the Congress' constitutional authority to prescribe
eligibility for any veterans benefit").
335. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 484 (1955) (noting that means must
merely be related to ends to survive rational review). That the sanction is necessary to achieve
the purpose places the statute on safe grounds for the purposes of rationality review. Cf W.
David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48
CAL. L. REV. 216, 223 (1960) (noting that object of immigration laws such as law in question
in Flemming have same purpose - removal of evil effect - and punishment, if any exists, is
merely inherent side effect and not independent object).
336. Seesupranotes302-35 and accompanyingtext(findingthat"similarconduct," "scien-
ter," and "deterrent" factors point to criminal punishment, while "tradition," "affirmative restraint
or disability," and "rational alternative that is not disproportionate" indicate civil remedy).
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punishment.337 Before closing this analysis, however, a court should examine
two factors in addition to those listed in Mendoza-Martinez to determine if it
supports the sanction's civil or criminal character. 38
(2) Additional Factors
(a) The Nation's Mood
Next, this Note examines the statute in this case to determine whether the
mood of Congress and of the country was so vindictive after the bombing that
anything Congress did immediately after McVeigh's trial that affects him
directly was punishment. 39 The bombing understandably outraged most citi-
zens of the United States.34 This outrage took many forms. Congress almost
immediately passed sweeping changes in antiterrorism, habeas corpus, and
death penalty laws to ensure that the government would adequately punish any
similar future crimes.341 Even before the Department of Justice charged
McVeigh, Attorney General Janet Reno announced that the Department of
Justice would seek the death penalty against anyone convicted of the bomb-
ing.342 The families of the victims, almost certainly seeking revenge against
McVeigh, pushed both the legislative and executive branches to punish Mc-
Veigh and his co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, to the fullest extent of the law." 3
The families of McVeigh's victims lobbied for the enactment of what
eventually became the Denial Act.3" As in Cummings, it is unlikely that the
337. SeeHudsonv. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488,496(1997) (findinglackofclearestproof
required to transform civil sanction into criminal punishment); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242,251 (1980) (requiring "clearest proof" that remedy is punitive in either purpose or effect).
338. See Ward, 448 U.S. at249 (finding thatMendoza-Martinez factors are neither exhaus-
tive nor dispositive in determining whether civil sanction is punitive in form or effect).
339. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,322 (1866) (noting that Civil War
had to affect passage of sanction during Civil War that directly affected Confederate sympathiz-
ers and that punitive intent from those that enacted sanction may have entered into amendment).
340. See Jack Kisling, Ho, Hum, The Sky Is Falling, DENV. PosT, June 22, 1997, at D2,
available in 1997 WL 6077330 (calling McVeigh "enemy of the people").
341. See Paul Queary, When Victims'Families Talk; Congress Listens, Acts, DENV. POST,
June 20, 1997, at Al1, available in 1997 WL 6077175 (noting that Oklahoma City bombing
victims' families are pushing changes in federal law, including laws affecting military burial and
death penalty appeals).
342. See Roberto Suro, How a Federal Case Becomes a Capital Case; Secret Panel Must
Weigh Legal Issues, Cost ofProsecution andPublic Demandsfor Vengeance, WASH.POST, Jan.
11, 1998, at A14, available in 1998 WL 2461431 (describing death penalty decision in Okla-
homa City case).
343. See Queary, supra note 341, at All (noting that Oklahoma City bombing victims'
families are pushing changes in federal law, including laws affecting military burial and death
penalty appeals).
344. See Chronis,supranote4, atAl (quoting SenatorNickles from Oklahoma, who stated
that possibility that McVeigh would be buried in national cemetery created "quite a furor");
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punitive feelings which the country, the victims' families, and Congress felt
toward McVeigh did not affect legislation enacted closely after his convic-
tion.45 This type of excited action is precisely the type of legislation that the
Ex Post Facto Clauses seek to prevent.346 This factor warrants consideration
when determining whether the punitive effect of the sanction can transform
it into a criminal penalty.
(1) Bill ofAttainder
The Denial Act applies to a very small number of persons.347 House Bill
2040, the predecessor to the act in question, only applied to Timothy McVeigh
and Terry Nichols.348 This feature requires analysis to determine whether the
sanction's limited applicability makes it more likely to be criminal punish-
ment.349
A bill of attainder is a bill that imposes punishment on an easily dis-
cernible class without the benefit of the protections of ajudicial trial. 5 The
Kisling, supra note 340,'at D2 (noting influence of victims' families and that families would
not "have put up with an idiotic hitch in the rules that would have let McVeigh be buried in a
national cemetery"); Queary, supra note 341, at Al (noting pressure from victims' families to
pass legislation and prevent McVeigh's burial in national cemetery).
345. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 615 (1960) (noting circumstantial evidence
of mood and fierce passions aroused in country at time of enactment may show punitive intent);
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322 (1866) ("It would have been strange,
therefore, had [the amendment] not exhibited in its provisions some traces of the excitement
admits which the convention held its deliberations.").
346. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 322 ("It was against the excited action of the
States, under such influences as these, that the framers of the Federal Constitution intended to
guard."); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,137-38 (1810) ("Whatever respect might have
been felt for the state sovereignties, it is not to be disguised that the framers of the constitution
viewed, with some apprehension, the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the
moment .... ).
347. See 143 CoNG. REc. H9838 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1997) (statement of Rep. Evans)
(noting limited applicability of bill); see also Kenneth E. Johnson, Comment, Limiting the
Legislative Veto: Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1721,
1732 (1981) (noting that another sign of lack of procedural due process in statute would be its
retrospective nature).
348. See Hearings, supra note 24, at78 (statement of Johnny Killain, attorney for Congres-
sional Research Service) (noting fact that only one person was subject to sanction from any bill
Congress was considering).
349. See California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 520 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("The narrower the class burdened by retroactive legislation, the greater the
danger that the legislation has the characteristics of a bill of attainder.").
350. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,468 (1977) (noting that bill
of attainder is "a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identi-
fiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial").
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United States Constitution bars bills of attainder.35 The Bill of Attainder
Clauses, along with the Ex Post Facto Clauses, seek to limit the passions of
the moment that the majority might feel toward a small minority, unprotected
by the political process.352 The framers intended the clauses to be a strong
check on tyranny.353 The Denial Act, however, is not a bill of attainder
because even if it inflicts punishment, it does so only after a judicial trial.5 4
However, the fact that the Denial Act imposes punishment on an easily
discernible group while sanctioning a minority that the normal political
process has left unprotected may prevent a court from applying it retrospec-
tively to McVeigh.
355
The protections of due process that are absent when Congress sanctions
a small number of persons guard against the same potential for abuse as the
Bill of Attainder Clauses. 56 When Congress legislates against a small, select
group of persons, courts question the presumption of procedural due process
inherent in congressional enactments toward society as a whole.357 Only when
351. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."); U.S. CoNsT. art. , § 10, cl. I (prohibiting states from enacting bills of attainder).
352. See Fletcherv. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,137-38(1810) (noting protections ofBill
of Attainder Clause). In Fletcher, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
Whatever respect might have been felt for the state sovereignties, it is not to be
disguised that the framers of the constitution viewed, with some apprehension, the
violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and that the
people ofthe United States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested a determi-
nation to shield themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and
strong passions to which men are exposed. The restrictions on the legislative power
of the States are obviously founded in this sentiment; and the Constitution of the
United States contains what may be deemed a bill of rights for the people of each
State,] included in which was the Bill of Attainder Clause.
Id.
353. See Jane Welsh, Note, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unqualified Guarantee of
Process, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 77, 85 (1983) ("There is no doubt that the Framers intended these
provisions as powerful weapons against tyranny and basic to the social principles upon which
the new nation was founded.").
354. 38 U.S.C. § 241 1(b)(3) (1997). The Department of Veterans Affairs can impose the
sanction after an administrative hearing, but procedural protections such as a higher burden of
proof are present for the protection of the accused. kd § 2411.
355. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring) (raising separation of power arguments over similar bill).
356. See id. (Powell, J., concurring) (noting tyranny that arises from bills of such specific-
ity).
357. See id. (Powell, J., concurring) ("The only effective constraint on Congress' power
is political, but Congress is most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of general
applicability. When it decides rights of specific persons, those rights are subject to 'the tyranny
of a shifting majority."); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,445-
46 (1915) (finding that when rule of conduct applies to only few people, due process may
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a statute applies to a larger number of people will a political check prevent
Congress from acting vindictively."'
As noted above, however, the Denial Act is not a bill of attainder." 9 Nor
is it, strictly speaking, the type of statute that violates the Due Process
Clause3" because it issues a rule of general applicability. 61 However, it does
share enough factors in common with these two prohibited types of legislation
to support the argument that the Denial Act's sanction lacks the essential
protections of both the Bill of Attainder Clause and the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. This observation might give a court another factor
to consider when determining whether the sanction as applied to McVeigh
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. 62
3. The Result
When applying the Mendoza-Martinez test, the Supreme Court requires
the clearest proof of either intent to punish or criminal punishment in form
and effect. 63 This clearest proof is necessary to overcome the presumption
of constitutionality that the Court gives to each congressional enactment."
This high standard leads to the conclusion that a court would find that the
Denial Act does not impose criminal punishment on Timothy McVeigh and
thus that applying the statute to him does not violate the federal Ex Post Facto
Clause.365
require individualized hearings); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (finding that
when legislation affects only small number of people, dueprocess requires hearing).
358. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that when Congress
sanctions individuals, normal political process does not check it).
359. See supra notes 347-55 and accompanying text (examining Denial Act and determin-
ing that it is not bill of attainder because those affected already had judicial trial).
360. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (barring deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law).
361. See Johnson, supra note 347, at 1732 (noting that procedural due process cases apply
only to statutes withoutgeneral, across board applicability). Despitethe small number ofpersons
it affects, the Denial Act does apply to the population at large. It can render any veteran
ineligible for burial in a national cemetery. See 38 U.S.C. § 2411 (1997) (placing limits on all
applications for burial after enactment).
362. See California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,522 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("The danger of legislative overreaching against which the Ex Post Facto Clause
protects is particularly acute when the target of the legislation is a narrow group as unpopular
(to put it mildly) as multiple murderers."); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 966 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting problems with legislating on rights of
minuscule minority).
363. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (noting clearest proof standard).
364. See id. (noting presumption of constitutionality).
365. See Cheh, supra note 148, at 1358 (explaining that Supreme Court has never con-
cluded that factors indicated punishment).
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 591 (1999)
The legislative history and structure of the statute are inconclusive, and
they do not clearly indicate a punitive purpose.366 Once a court has deter-
mined that the legislative intent of the law is civil, only the clearest proof of
the punitive form and effect of the statute will transform the civil remedy into
a criminal punishment. 67 In recent years, the Court has marginalized the
Mendoza-Martinez factors that indicate a punitive effect.3 6 McVeigh's case
only satisfies a few factors369 and does not constitute the clearest proof that the
Court requires to transform a civil remedy into criminal punishment.370 The
additional factors that this Note identifies, including the mood of the country
and the small number of persons that the act affects, likely are insufficient to
create the clearest proof that the sanction is criminal punishment.37'
In sum, given the current state of the law, the Denial Act does not violate
the federal Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to McVeigh because it does not
criminally punish him. However, all the evidence of punitive intent and puni-
tive effect372 raises the question of whether an enactment of Congress too
easily meets civil sanction standards. The remainder of this Note develops a
new test that courts should adopt which would recognize the benefits of some
retrospective legislation but would prevent Congress from enacting legislation
that violates the core of the Ex Post Facto Clauses.
1V A New Analysis
The Mendoza-Martinez analysis, which the Court revived in Hudson, is
susceptible to abuse.373 It is easy for legislatures to evade any kind of mean-
ingful scrutiny by placing a civil label on the sanction, settling the Court's
debate on congressional intent.374 Even if Congress fails to do so, the Court's
366. Seesupranotes260-95 andaccompanyingtext(exploringlegislativehistoryindetail).
367. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488,493 (1997) (stating standard for objec-
tive Mendoza-Martinez factors).
368. See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text (noting lessening emphasis on some
Mendoza-Martinez factors).
369. See supra notes 302-38 and accompanying text (applying Mendoza-Martinez factors
to Denial Act and concluding that only three indicate punitive effect).
370. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496 (finding statute civil despite its fitting into two factors).
371. See Flemming v.Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,620 (1960) (requiring overwhelming evidence
for civil sanction to transform into criminal sanction and violate Ex Post Facto Clauses).
372. See supra notes 273-88, 316-20 and accompanying text (presenting evidence ofpuni-
tive intent from legislative history and three Mendoza-Martinez factors that indicate punitive
effect).
373. See Ricciardi & Sinclair, supra note 21, at 325 (noting that courts or Congress can
recharacterize any criminal law as civil).
374. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. CL 2072, 2082 (1997) (accepting civil label as
dispositive); see also infra notes 404-13 and accompanying text (discussing problem ofmanipu-
lating legislative history).
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disdain for using legislative history to determine intent and the presumption
of constitutionality that the Court gives to congressional enactments will
almost certainly render a finding of nonpunitive intent.375 On the objective
side of the analysis, the Supreme Court's application of some of the standards
makes any challenge that does not involve imprisonment an uphill battle. 76
The Court's requirement that the challenger of a statute prove the punitive
effect of a statute with the clearest evidence has made it quite difficult to
support a nonimprisonment ex post facto claim." This potential for abuse
should prompt the courts to reconsider the Mendoza-Martinez factors and to
develop a new standard for determining whether a civil sanction is punitive
in intent or effect. After examining what the framers intended when they
drafted the Ex Post Facto Clauses and after analyzing the problems with the
Mendoza-Martineztest, this Part proposes a new standard for approaching the
Ex Post Facto Clauses. This new standard relies less on what Congress says
and more on the objective factors that more truly indicate whether the statute
criminally punishes a particular individual.
A. The Framers'Intent
In Calder, Justice Chase assumed that the framers, when drafting the Ex
Post Facto Clauses, intended to incorporate the English definition of "ex post
facto."37 He thus limited its application to laws that adjudge a greater criminal
punishment than the person would have received for actions committed prior
to the statute's enactment ?79 Although Justice Chase wrote only eleven years
after the drafting of the Constitution, he may have misinterpreted the framers'
intent for the Ex Post Facto Clauses. ° This subpart provides a brief evalua-
tion of the protection the clauses were to contribute to provide background
when creating a new standard to judge whether sanctions are civil or criminal.
The framers included the clauses in the Constitution to prevent arbitrary
and vindictive legislation.8 They also included them to prevent legislators
375. See supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text (discussing obstacles for claims
attacking legislative history).
376. See infra note 414 and accompanying text (noting definition of "traditional punish-
ment" and "affirmative restraints").
377. See infra notes 417-21 and accompanying text (noting standard for challenging on
punitive effect of sanction).
378. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386,389 (1798) (accepting English definition of
ex post facto laws).
379. See id. at 390 (limiting clause to laws that criminally punish).
380. See Field, supra note 52, at 317 (noting possibility of another interpretation of
framers' intent).
381. See Fletcherv. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) (arguing that clauses restrain
power of legislature over lives and fortunes of individuals); Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 391
(stating that clauses protect against laws that are unjust and oppressive); Aiken, supra note
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from punishing in order to maintain separation of powers.8 2 To allow ex post
facto laws would allow the legislature, in times of turmoil, to infringe upon
the rights of an individual in a most insidious way.383 In Calder, Justice Chase
limited the rights that the clauses protect to the ability to avoid retroactive
criminal punishment. " However, it is likely that the framers intended to
protect property rights as well. 85
History provides little evidence that the framers intended for the clauses
to have the technical definition that Calder gives to them.386 The text of the
clauses makes no distinction between civil and criminal laws.387 Some evi-
dence exists, however, that the framers included the Ex Post Facto Clauses to
prevent the retroactive application of civil as well as criminal laws. 8 In
debates on the clauses, the framers made few distinctions between civil and
criminal retroactive laws.8 9 In fact, they used retrospective civil sanctions as
examples of the evils of ex post facto laws."9 Therefore, several scholars
have suggested that Calder was wrong when it interpreted the intent of the
framers.
391
After Calder, several Justices argued for a more expansive interpretation
of the Ex Post Facto Clauses that was consistent with the purposes of the
13, at 324 ("Such laws place the citizens at the mercy of the government, unable to know the
consequences of their acts and constantly subject to the possibility of legislative vindictive-
ness.").
382. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 329 (noting role of clauses in separation of powers).
383. See id. (stating protection of liberty in clause).
384. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,390 (1798) ("I do not think [the clause] was
inserted to secure the citizen in his private rights, of either property, or contracts."); see also
John HartEly, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1312 n.324 (1970) (noting Justices in Calder expected other constitutional provisions to
play stronger role in protecting against retrospective legislation than they presently do).
385. See Field, supra note 52, at 322 ("Protections such as these were considered as
essential to liberty as the personal liberty of citizens. Property protection was as vital as
personal protection.").
386. See id. at 321 ("[T]here is not a single mention of the practice of the British Parlia-
ment to which Justice Chase referred in his opinion in Calder v. Bull.").
387. See id. (noting lack of textual distinction between civil and criminal penalties).
388. See id. at 319-20 (stating that Madison believed clause applied to civil as well as
criminal laws and noting evidence that framers used terms ex post facto and retrospective
synonymously).
389. See id at 327 (noting lack of distinction between criminal and civil laws).
390. See Ricciardi & Sinclair, supra note 21, at 305-06 (noting that Madison used
retrospective and ex post facto interchangeably and noting that many drafters thought impairing
of obligations of contract would be ex post facto law).
391. See William Winslow Crosskey, The True Meaning ofthe Constitutional Prohibition
of Ex-Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. Cm. L. REV. 539, 547 (1946) (stating that framers intended
clauses to apply to civil legislation); Field, supra note 52, at 328 (same).
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clauses and the framers' intent.392 For example, in Fletcher, Chief Justice
Marshall applied the state Ex Post Facto Clause to a civil statute without
reference to Calder, apparently concluding that the clauses applied to both
criminal and civil legislative enactments. 93 In an opinion written almost
thirty years after Calder, Justice Johnson argued that the Court should apply
the clauses to civil legislation.394 He added that Calder leaves "a large class
of arbitrary legislative acts without the prohibitions of the constitution." '395
Justice Johnson argued that the Court should not read Justice Chase's opinion
in Calder as the holding of the case and that the history of the clauses suggests
that they are equally applicable to civil legislation."' Nonetheless, because
of the precedential value of Calder, Justice Johnson concurred in Calder's
treatment of civil sanctions.397
Calder's criminal/civil distinction has existed too long to argue that the
Supreme Court should overturn it.398 Not only is Calder long-standing prece-
dent,39' but even the framers agreed that some retrospective civil laws were
necessary for the efficient operation of government.4" The argument over the
validity of Calder and the framers' concern with retrospective civil legisla-
392. See Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416 (1829) (Johnson, J., concur-
ring) (arguing against Calder's limitations on clauses); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,
137 (1810) (applying Ex Post Facto Clauses to civil statute).
393. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text (noting Chief Justice Marshall's
application of clauses to statute without first limiting or distinguishing Calder).
394. See Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 416 (Johnson, J., concurring) (calling application of
clauses to criminal laws "unhappy idea").
395. Id.
396. See id. at 681 (Johnson, J., appending) (listing reasons that Calder is not authority for
Ex Post Facto Clauses and is wrongly decided if it is).
397. See id. at 416 (Johnson, J., concurring) (deciding on basis of precedent to concur in
judgment).
398. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,41 n.2 (1990) (noting debate about accuracy
of Calder but electing to adhere to view expressed by Justice Chase); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (noting that Ex Post Facto Clauses only applied to
criminal punishment, and although that doctrine may be debatable, scholars and courts have
considered subject closed for many years and body of statutory law has grown up around that
doctrine). But see Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2154 (1998) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) ("In an appropriate case, therefore, I would be willing to reconsider Calder and its progeny
to determine whether a retroactive civil law that passes muster under our current Takings Clause
jurisprudence is nonetheless unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause.").
399. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-68 (1992)
(discussing importance of precedent).
400. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 332 (noting that framers conceded that at times, retroac-
tive civil laws may be necessary); cf Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,267-68 (1994)
(noting benefits ofretrospective laws, including responding to emergencies, correcting mistakes,
preventing circumvention of new statutes in intervals immediately preceding their passage, or
giving comprehensive effect to new laws Congress considers salutary).
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tion, however, provides some perspective when analyzing the current permis-
sive standard that allows most retrospective civil sanctions to stand.40'
B. Problems with the Current Standard
Even though the Supreme Court recognizes a distinction between civil
and criminal legislation, a searching determination of whether Congress
intended a sanction to be criminal and whether the sanction was criminal in
effect would eliminate most of the legislation that violates the policies behind
the clauses.40 2 The current standard does not provide such a searching inquiry.
The Supreme Court has never invalidated a law under the Ex Post Facto
Clauses using the Mendoza-Martinez factors.4 3 Several aspects ofthe current
test prevent the revealing, evenhanded inquiry into retrospective legislation
that the Ex Post Facto Clauses demand.
The first half of the Mendoza-Martinez analysis allows Congress to label
a sanction as civil and to avoid any searching constitutional inquiry.4"' Even
if Congress fails to place a "civil" label within a statute, its knowledge of the
constitutional standard used in determining civil or criminal intent provides
a large incentive for congressmen to use legislative history to deceive the
courts as to true congressional intent.4 5 For example, the House ofRepresenta-
tives's Committee on Veterans Affairs had an attorney from the Congressional
Research Service testify concerning the Denial Act.4' He informed Congress
that courts would examine the legislative history of any act that might come
out of these hearings for criminally punitive intent.407 Immediately after the
attorney completed his explanation, one congressman remarked, for the
401. See Harold J. Krent, The PuzzlingBoundaryBetween Criminal and CivilRetroactive
Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143,2143 (1996) ("IT]he Court has sanctioned legislative fiaxibility
in the civil context, permitting the legislature to trample upon the reliance interests of individu-
als and companies almost at will.").
402. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 359 (arguing for stricter application of civil/criminal
distinction to ex post facto challenges).
403. See Cheh, supra note 148, at 1358 (noting that Supreme Court has never relied upon
factors to invalidate law as criminal punishment); see also Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations on
Legislative Power, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 1491, 1505 (1975) ("[C]ourts have all too often failed to
consider the possibility that retroactive punishments imposed outside the criminal process are
as unjust and as potentially abusive as those imposed within the criminal process.").
404. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997) (noting that civil label is not
dispositive, but clearest proof of punitive effect required to overrule).
405. See Ricciardi & Sinclair, supra note 21, at 325 (arguing that Congress can reword any
criminal sanction as remedial).
406. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 15-26 (statement of Johnny Killain, attorney for
Congressional Research Service) (discussing potential constitutional ramification ofHouseBill
2040 and Senate Bill 923).
407. See id. at 16-17 (explaining to members of Congress that court may examine legisla-
tive history in search of hostility or punitive intent).
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record, that the intent of the bill was to preserve the sanctity of national
cemeteries, not to punish McVeigh.4 " Several other congressmen followed
suit as the hearing continued.4" This example suggests that Congress can
easily fabricate its intent."' It is just as easy to place a label within the text
of a bill as it is to fabricate legislative history in a committee hearing. This is
especially true once Congress understands that the constitutionality of a bill
may depend upon its label. No rational Congress would ever place a criminal
label on a retrospective bill.4" Despite this possibility, courts will accept a
congressional label as unmistakable evidence of a civil sanction.412 The
current standard gives the legislature the power to determine when it violates
the Ex Post Facto Clauses. It should come as no surprise, then, that it hardly
ever does.413 This power seems odd considering that the framers included the
clauses to prevent legislative abuse.
Another problem with the Court's standard lies in the objective portion
of the Mendoza-Martinez test. The Court will not classify any sanction other
than imprisonment as punishment for two of the standards in that test
41 4
Therefore, any challenge not including imprisonment enters the analysis with
little chance of demonstrating the "clearest proof" of punitive effect.415 Con-
gress imposes a rising number of civil sanctions not involving imprisonment
that regulate the actions of individuals, and it is likely that some of these may
be criminally punitive in effect.416 Yet, under the Court's current rationale,
408. See id. at 17 (statement of Rep. Evans) (stating that purpose of sanction was reme-
dial).
409. See id at 18-21 (noting remedial nature of bill).
410. See J. David Guerrera, Note, Constitutional Law: The Meaning ofPrompt Judicial
Review Under the PriorRestraintDoctrineAfter FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 62 BROOK. L. REv.
1217, 1259 (1996) (noting that loose standards give too great of opportunity for legislative
abuse).
411. See Sean M. Dunn, Note, United States v. Ursery: Drug Offenders Forfeit The ir Fi h
Amendment Rights, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1207, 1241 (1997) (noting leeway Congress has in
fabricating intent when Court only subjects it to "clearest proof" standard); Guerrera, supra
note 410, at 1259 (noting ease with which Congress can fabricate intent); Note, Why Learned
Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1016 (1992)
(noting ease with which Congress can create legislative history to fool judges).
412. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 495 (1997) (accepting civil label).
413. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 333 (noting lack of success for challengers of civil
sanctions on ex post facto grounds).
414. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 495-96 (applying "affirmative disability" and "traditional
punishment" tests to money forfeiture and concluding that because money forfeiture is not
imprisonment, sanction is not punishment).
415. See id at 496 (finding that sanction was civil even though two factors pointed toward
punitive effect).
416. See Cheh, supra note 148, at 1333 (noting congressional use of civil sanctions);
Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The MiddlegroundBetween Criminal and CivilLaw,
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a challenger to a sanction that does not include imprisonment faces an almost
impossible burden. At a time when Congress's opportunities for abuse are
rising, the courts should use a test that can adequately confront the evils that
the framers believed the Ex Post Facto Clauses prohibited.
Finally, courts can easily manipulate the Mendoza-Martinez test.417 A
court can focus on one of the factors indicating a civil sanction and subse-
quently discount any other factors that point toward a punitive effect.418 The
"clearest proof" standard allows this manipulation1 9 because a court can
always claim that Congress did not provide the clearest proof of punitive
effect as long as one factor indicates a remedial effect. It is impossible to
prevent manipulation of a factor test when applied by determined judges.42
By making the factors more accessible to challengers of sanctions, however,
that manipulation will become more difficult. 2
All these problems reveal themselves in the case study of the Denial
Act.4' Congress announced a remedial purpose for the bill after learning that
it must do so in order for the act to survive a constitutional challenge.4" Even
101 YALE L.L 1795, 1801, 1844 (1992) (noting increase in civil sanctions in legislation and
increase in agency use of civil sanctions); see also Debra Marie Ingraham, Note, Civil Money
Sanctions Barred by Double Jeopardy: Should the Supreme Court Reject Healy?, 54 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1183, 1188 (1997) (noting growth in number of civil sanctions authorized by
regulatory legislation).
417. See Linda R. Crane, Family Values and the Supreme Court, 25 CONN. L. REv. 427,
469 (1993) (noting ease with which court can manipulate standards to reach morally based
judgments).
418. See Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law? - A Reply to Professor
Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729, 747-49 (1963) (noting that standards can always produce
desired result); Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, JudicialActivism andRestraint in the
Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 343,373-77 (1989) (noting
ease with which courts can manipulate factors involving legislative history); Patricia M. Wald,
The Rhetoric ofResults andthe Results ofRhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371,
1391-94 (1995) (noting courts will "transmogrify" standards in order to achieve desired result);
cf Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 501 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that
Court should drop "clearest proof" standard).
419. See Erik Grant Luna, Fiction Trumps Innocence: The Bennis Court's Constitutional
House ofCards, 49 STAN.L.RE. 409,426(1997)(calling clearestproofstandard an "injuriously
high threshold"); Amy D. Ronner, Prometheus Unbound: Acceptinga Mythless Concept ofCivil
In Rem Forfeiture with Double Jeopardy Protection, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 655,762 (1996) (noting
that clearestproofstandard allows Courtmerely to pay lip service to Mendoza-Martinezfactors).
420. See Paul E. Loving, The Justice of Certainty, 73 OR.L. REv. 743, 751 (1994) (noting
courts will always impose own beliefs of right and wrong onto multifactor test, no matter what
factors are).
421. SeeAiken, supra note 13, at360 (arguingthat Court should make factors more acces-
sible to challengers of laws).
422. See supra Part III.
423. See supranotes 404-13 and accompanyingtext (showing possibility offaking remed-
ial intent).
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if the statement of remedial purpose was completely false, that statement plus
the placement of the statute in Title 38 of the United States Code probably is
enough to establish a remedial intent, despite other punitive legislative
history.424 The statute does not provide the clearest objective proof of puni-
tive form and effect because it does not involve imprisonment.4z Congress's
ability to manipulate the standards, the Court's limited definition of "tradi-
tional punishment," and the "clearest proof' standard make it very difficult to
prove that a statute is criminally punitive, even if it has many punitive traits.
Recognizing these flaws, courts should develop a new standard that empha-
sizes factors which truly indicate whether Congress intended the statute to
punish and whether the statute has punitive effects.
C. A Move Toward an Objective Standard
Because of the viability of Calder, the Ex Post Facto Clauses will con-
tinue to apply only to criminal laws and to laws that are so punitive that the
courts consider them criminal punishments.426 As noted above, however, the
difference in the current interpretation of the clauses and the policies behind
the clauses presents a strong case that courts should use a new standard that
courts and Congress can less easily manipulate.427 A new standard is espe-
cially important with the current congressional trend toward imposing more
and more civil sanctions to regulate the activity of individuals.42
The two-part standard that courts now use will work with some revisions.
If Congress intended the sanction to punish, or the sanction has punitive form
and effect, it is criminal punishment.429 The Supreme Court has previously
defined punitive intent as the desire to sanction the person affected rather than
to regulate the activity affected.43 This distinction is without definition and
424. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (requiring clearest proof of
legislative intent to punish).
425. See supra notes 417-21 and accompanying text (showing difficulty in establishing
clearest proof of punitive form and effect).
426. See Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting application of
clause to civil sanctions that courts consider punishment), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998).
427. See supra notes 404-21 and accompanying text (presenting problems with current ex
post facto jurisprudence).
428. See supra note 416 and accompanying text (discussing rise in civil sanctions).
429. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 360 (noting both subjective and objective standards
indicate punishment); Maria Foscarinis, Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition ofPunish-
ment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1670-78 (1980) (noting intent and effects are two key compo-
nents of punishment).
430. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,320 (1866) (noting definition of
punishment); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTONAL LAW 484 (1978)
("[Courts should instead focus on the danger that those enacting the new procedures did so
with knowledge of whom they would adversely affect and how.").
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is thus essentially meaningless. Any attempt to regulate an activity necessar-
ily sanctions the person performing the activity. Likewise, any attempt to
sanction an individual regulates the activity for which the individual is being
sanctioned. It is almost impossible to accomplish one without the other.
Instead of using this vacuous phrase, courts should focus instead on whether
Congress was, or intended to be, vindictive.43
Courts should analyze indicia of punitive intent with this in mind and
should place little emphasis upon legislative history that members of Congress
can manipulate.432 The courts should focus on objective manifestations of
vindictive congressional intent, such as evidence of outside pressure to punish
an individual,433 evidence of the mood of the country which is so overwhelm-
ing that it presumptively affects Congress,434 prior versions of the same
legislation,435 the form and structure of the statute enacted,436 and the number
of people that the sanction affects. 437 Courts should also consider some
evidence that Congress could potentially manipulate. Courts should examine
such evidence closely, however, in order to determine if legislators have
offered it solely to prevail in a constitutional challenge.438
Second, because of the important policies behind the Ex Post Facto
Clauses, courts should eliminate the high burden placed on proving a civil
sanction's criminally punitive nature.439 The framers included the clauses in
431. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 327 (noting vindictiveness of legislation shows
its criminally punitive nature); Aiken, supra note 13, at 361 (finding that vindictiveness can be
shown when bill is directed at certain individuals or when legislatures know that sanctions will
harm specific individuals); Ely, supra note 384, at 1303 n.293 (noting that investigations into
legislative motivation for vindictiveness may be necessary under certain circumstances).
432. See supra notes 406-13 and accompanying text (citing potential problem of doctoring
legislative history). Examples of such legislative history would be statements at committee
hearings and labels placed within the text of a statute.
433. See supra note 344 and accompanying text (discussing pressure from families of
victims of bombing to enact legislation preventing McVeigh's burial in national cemetery).
434. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 322 (noting that harsh, retributive feelings from
Civil War had to affect state constitutional amendment).
435. See supra notes 260-69 and accompanying text (discussing how previous versions of
Denial Act can indicate punitive intent).
436. See Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing form and
structure of community notification act in determining if there was punitive effect), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998).
437. See supra notes 347-58 and accompanying text (presenting problems with legislation
that affects small number of persons).
438. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 360 (arguing that retrospective laws should be subject
to more stringent scrutiny).
439. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L.
Rnv. 56, 88 (1997) (arguing that courts should scrutinize more strictly laws that affect solely
discrete and insular minorities because they reflect prejudices that render democratic process
648
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order to curb legislative abuse."0 Yet the "clearest proof" requirement makes
it too difficult to establish that this legislative abuse has taken place." Elim-
inating the "clearest proof' requirement would make a challenger ofa sanction
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Congress intended to punish." 2
If one cannot prove through objective evidence that Congress had a
punitive intent, the challenger should have an opportunity to prove that the
statute was punitive in form and effect using the Mendoza-Martinez factors."3
The courts must recognize, however, that traditional punishment and affirma-
tive restraints involve more than imprisonment.4' Under the revised test, a
sanction could meet those standards any time that the government prevents an
individual from exercising a right that he could have exercised prior to the
law's enactment.44
These changes will reduce the ability of the courts to manipulate the
standards. The courts will no longer be able to hide behind one or two
Mendoza-Martinez standards and claim that the challenger did not present
enough evidence of punitive form and effect to meet the "clearest proof"
burden." 6
This new objective test would not change the result every time someone
challenges a retrospective civil sanction as a violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clauses. It should not invalidate all retrospective sanctions, because there are
some benefits to certain limited retrospective laws.447 In fact, the new objec-
tive test may not change the result if McVeigh were to challenge the Denial
Act.44" It would, however, make it easier to strike down retrospective civil
untrustworthy). Laws directed against McVeigh are arguably as untrustworthy as any law
affecting a discrete and insular minority.
440. See supranotes 386-91 and accompanying text (discussing framers' intent for clauses).
441. See supra notes 417-21 and accompanying text (describing problems with "clearest
proof" standard).
442. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 333 (noting framers did not contemplate high standard).
443. See Kennedyv. Mendoza-Martinez,372 U.S. 144,168-69(1963) (giving opportunity
to prove punitive form and effect).
444. See United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 613-16 (1993) (noting that governments
have used punishments other than imprisonment throughout history).
445. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1866) (noting punishment
involves more than loss of liberty).
446. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 496 (1997) (using two Mendoza-
Martinez factors to prevent transformation into criminal punishment); Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. at 169 (requiring clearest proof of punitive form and effect to transform intended civil
sanction into criminal punishment).
447. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 360 (noting flexibility in government requires some
retrospective laws).
448. See supra notes 297-338 and accompanying text (applying traditional factors to
Denial Act). Because the courts would discount most congressional speeches as easily manipu-
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legislation, especially legislation with clear objective indications of vindic-
tiveness. This is precisely what the framers intended the Ex Post Facto
Clauses to do." 9
V Conclusion
The framers included the Ex Post Facto Clauses in the Constitution to
prevent the enactment of vindictive retrospective legislation. It is arguable
whether the framers intended the clauses to cover all laws or merely those
laws that imposed criminal punishment. Regardless, the clauses presently
cover only retrospective criminal laws. However, the Supreme Court pro-
vided some grounds for those who sought to have civil sanctions overturned
on ex post facto grounds. If a challenger could clearly prove that a civil
sanction was a criminal punishment in disguise, the Court would invalidate it.
The Court eventually began testing both the intent and the effects of the
sanction to determine if a civil sanction was a criminal punishment.
The application of the Court's test to the Denial Act reveals that the test
may be too burdensome for a challenger. The factors in the test are stacked
against a challenger of a sanction. The test relies too heavily on easily manip-
ulated indicia of congressional intent. In the objective half of the test, two
factors are almost impossible to meet. Finally, the clearest proof requirement
has made it easy for a court to manipulate the factors to determine the out-
come. The Supreme Court must change the test in order to protect fully
against the kind of arbitrary and vindictive legislation that the clauses exist to
prevent. This Note suggests one possible solution - a new test that would use
objective indicia to provide a clearer view of whether the sanction in question
is truly criminal punishment.
lated, the intent test would focus on whether outside indicia of punishment could overcome
those discounted speeches and other indications ofacivil intent. The effect test would generally
be the same because although this is probably an affirmative restraint, even under a liberalized
view it is not a traditional form of punishment.
449. See Aiken, supra note 13, at 324 (noting purpose of Ex Post Facto Clauses).
